

FIGHTING DEMONS

Pakistan's War on Terror - 9 / 11 to Radd-ul-Fassad

Lieutenant Colonel Mian Nadir Sulaiman

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by

Lieutenant Colonel Mian Nadir Sulaiman

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Dedicated to ...

...the people of Pakistan, whose courage and resilience enabled them to successfully deal with the challenges of the War on Terror, while stronger countries collapsed.

**I am terrorized in my own land,
and the blame is put on me!**

Eye to Eye - Gihad Ali

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PREFACE

Like most of my countrymen, I have often been bothered by the intriguing questions of the 'War on Terror'. Is it our war? Did Pakistan take the right decision at the appropriate time? Did we have a choice? How do we differentiate between a terrorist and a freedom fighter? Is there any real difference or is it only in the observer's perspective? Is it a religious calling for us or a political cause? Is there a difference between the Afghan Taliban and those of the Pakistani brand? Are the Americans, Zionists and Indians working hand in hand, conspiring against Pakistan, or are we just blaming others out of paranoia, or is it both? How will all this end? Will it end? What kind of a Pakistan do we want to leave for our children to grow up in?

Hence, this book initially started as my attempt of fact finding and soul searching. It was quite later that my notes started to take the shape of something worth publishing. It is by no means an attempt to impress the readers, most of whom may possibly have a better understanding of the subject and would therefore be able to reflect better, while many may be more eloquent in their writing. It will however benefit the casual reader, by giving them an insight of what mayhem Pakistan has survived through during the past two decades, where the country stands today, and what are the possible future scenarios for it, all of whom I may add are very positive. To the advanced reader, it will give an insight to Pakistan's policy making compulsions, the sides it chooses and why, and will make them appreciate its people's courage.

The book encompasses the rise and fall of terrorism and terror groups in Pakistan. It covers the nature of the extreme challenges that the nation waded through. It also touches upon the prevailing international environment and how it affected the war within Pakistan.

This research has left a lasting impact on my mind. Mostly, I am impressed with the resilience of the nation that was able to

survive through such trying times. Countries have imploded in lesser challenging situations. There is no dearth of material on the subject, however, I was forced to conclude that most of the material written by, and available to the western world, is often biased against Pakistan and does not take into account Pakistan's geo-strategic and socio-political diktats, nor does it give the country its due credit for braving the militant's onslaughts and contributing maximum towards the global war on terror.

Having donned the Pakistan Army uniform for the last two decades, I have lived through the war, have lost friends and have been affected by the mayhem this war has caused in more ways than one. This gives me a substantial vantage point to reflect upon. Some may disagree with the ensuing line of thinking; their criticism is welcome. It will only enable me and the rest of us to arrive at more educated conclusions.

I have intentionally avoided discussing the sectarian clashes and resultant terrorist activities, the Baluchistan issue and terrorist activities related thereto, and the crime and political terrorism in Karachi, firstly because these issues do not ideally fall under the ambit of the national / international umbrella of the 'War on Terror' (except until recently i.e. till the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb which sought to tackle all forms of terrorism indiscriminately), and secondly because these three subjects merit independent studies.

In the end, I would like to acknowledge the love and support of my parents, siblings and family, without whom, I would not have been able to pen down the ensuing pages.

Nadir
Islamabad
July 2018

INTRODUCTION

Anyone who is now in their teens, or even in early twenties is unlikely to recollect a world without terrorists, suicidal bombings, drone strikes, and news filled with sufferings of women and children. Though the world wasn't a bed of roses back in the day, it was definitely not as thorny as it is today - 9 / 11 being the watershed that demarcates and differentiates the two worlds. It could be argued that the transformation had started much earlier with the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of the USA as the sole superpower, nevertheless, 9/11 will still go down in history as the day the world changed. The post 9/11 world saw large scale wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and turmoil throughout much of the globe. The post 9/11 environment even led to the Arab Spring, which might otherwise not even have occurred, at least not yet.

Pakistan has been in the eye of the storm since that fateful day. Not one person from a population of 200 million has been left unscarred. Loss of loved ones is common. Social and psychological effects are widespread. From the time it reluctantly joined the "with us" camp, it is the sole country which has lost the most in the war, other than Afghanistan and Iraq, where the war is actually being fought. With the evacuation of U.S. forces in sight, Pakistan is yet again confronted with a dilemma of an unstable Afghanistan as its neighbor and the conglomerate of terrorist organizations in the form of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in its folds, not to mention having an arch rival to its east.

The Pakistani nation initially required some time to come to terms with its government's decision of joining the U.S-led coalition. Many reflected on it as betraying their Afghan Muslim brethren. The situation was further worsened by cases such as Lal Masjid incident, Raymond Davis fiasco, Balckwater's actions and drone attacks etc. Pak-U.S. relations remained in the doldrums during most of the preceding decade and even today these are not completely in the clear.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fassad, finally showed some light at the end of the tunnel, but only some. The road to peace and stability still seems to continue winding a bit more, a fact which is re-emphasized by last year's attacks such as the one at the Shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalander in Sehwan Sharif on 17 February 2017, resulting in the death of 88, injuring another 350 or the attack on the Senate Deputy Speaker Abdul Ghafoor Hayderi on 12 May 2017 in Mastung, resulting in the death of 25, injuring 40 others.

It is important for the world to understand why Pakistan joined the war, what did it win and lose in the war, and where is the road likely to lead from here. The same is also very important to understand for the younger Pakistani generation, so that old mistakes are not repeated, and the country moves forward on its road to a peaceful and prosperous future.

CHAPTER

1

PAKISTAN & 9 / 11

While the first half of the 20th century saw two world wars, the 2nd half of it saw the world divided into two distinct cold war camps; the American and the Soviet. Continuous and unnerving standoff between them often brought the world, within inches of a third world war, initiated a dangerous nuclear arms race and led to a large number of proxy wars. Afghanistan was one such proxy war, in which the two mighty powers of the time flexed their muscles. While Americans had left Vietnam relatively unceremoniously, Afghanistan turned out to be the *Bear Trap*¹ for the Soviets¹ and is thus also referred to as “Russia’s Vietnam”. The Russo-Afghan war led to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world with USA at the helm of affairs. While some hailed this changed international climate and looked forward to a more peaceful world, pundits of international affairs forecasted the challenges that lay ahead. At that time, all warnings sounded too distant and theoretical. But we all know that time flies, as it did.

By the end of the Russo-Afghan war, the Afghan infrastructure and social fabric had been torn apart completely. Thousands of fighters were suddenly left clueless about the future and the country spiraled into a civil war; out of which the Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, an Afghan Jihad veteran and a local Muslim cleric, emerged as winners. It was a good thing at the time. Though the Taliban held strict views about female freedom and their education, and other such ‘western’ ideas, nevertheless they were bringing order to a war-torn society and that seemed to be the right thing to do at that time.

Pakistan was the first country to recognize the Taliban government in Kabul as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. It favored Pakistan to align itself with the Taliban, since they were

¹ The Bear Trap, The defeat of a superpower, M. Yousuf, Mark Adkin, 1992

ethnic Pashtuns, a diaspora that Pakistan shared. They were also mostly the same Mujahideen whom Pakistan had helped train with western, more so American assistance. Al-Qaeda was not a word anyone had heard at the time. The name might have existed in some secret CIA or ISI files, but the world at large was unaware of any such entity, let alone the existence of a terrorist organization by that name.

Pakistan in 2001

Pakistan was 54 years old in 2001. The country had risen from humble beginnings. Its foundations were considered to have been intentionally flawed and weakened by the British-Hindu nexus, who found difficulty in reconciling with its creation and hoped and worked for its implosion. But the nation proved resilient, to say the least. It rose up to the challenges, fought through four wars with a neighbor 4 times its size, remained relevant to the geopolitical scenario during the cold war era, kept the major world players interested in itself, managed to become the 7th nuclear state, and was working on kick-starting its economy.

It wasn't without its fails though. The country had a marred political landscape which had been a mix of elected governments and military dictatorship. Corrupt politicians were rampant, sanctions due to nuclear weapons tests were crippling its economy, and it was facing serious challenges in its educational, health and employment fields. General Pervaiz Musharraf, having served initially as the Chief Executive, had now been appointed as the President of Pakistan.

Nevertheless, by and large it was a peaceful country, where everyday life was simple, mostly rural. A degree of anti-American sentiment harbored amongst the people, due to the perceived flaws in U.S. foreign policies, particularly in relation to global Muslim issues such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Though someone would shout, "Death to America" every now and then, it was not any particular thing to be worried about. Nobody was actually going to *kill America*, they would just express their frustration at the American methods of handling the world affairs. All this changed on 9/11.

Pakistan was catapulted to the center stage and was to stay in the limelight for the next two decades.

The Tragedy of 9 / 11

It has been almost 17 years since that fateful day that changed the world. Numerous theories have cropped up over time as to the *who's*, *how's* and *why's* of that tragedy. Some have accused that the Jews had done it to instigate and mobilize U.S. against the Muslim world, others have alleged that it was an inside job of the American Intelligence community, while still others have accused greedy U.S. military and business conglomerates, who view war and the rehabilitation that follows, as a profitable business. Doubts stemmed almost immediately after 9/11, as a consequence of the disjointed stories that the U.S. government officials initially propagated. Much room for doubt existed also, in the way the 9/11 commission was formed and its findings delayed.

Nevertheless, the official U.S. version states that 4 airplanes (United Airline 93, United Airline 175, American Airline 11 & American Airline 77²) were hijacked by 19 Al Qaeda terrorists, of



9/11

On the fateful day that changed the world, 19 terrorists hijacked 4 U.S. passenger planes, of which 2 were crashed into the WTC, one into the Pentagon building and another fell short of Washington D.C., leading to the death of approximately 3000 people belonging to 100 different countries.

² The 9 / 11 Commission Report, 2004, Page 32-33

which 2 aircrafts were intentionally crashed into the World Trade Centre and one into the Pentagon, while the fourth fell short of its possible objective (conspiracies suggest that it was shot down) in Washington D.C. Approximately 3000 people from about a hundred countries lost their life that day.


The attack on the American soil and the very nature of it, sent shock waves around the globe within minutes. The whole world was caught in awe and terror. U.S. had been the sole superpower in the preceding decade and its muscle remained unparalleled to an extent that it was perceived as unmatched at the time. This sudden attack had left the world gasping for breath, and extremely confused as to what was to follow. It was however certain almost immediately that the U.S. might have been challenged and that the U.S. had to respond as soon as possible, both to address intense internal public pressure and to reassert its superiority at the international level. Al Qaeda was identified as the responsible actor, almost immediately. Its bases in Afghanistan were already under surveillance and its leader, Osama Bin Laden was already the most wanted man in the U.S. due to his alleged involvement in a number of terrorist activities of the past, including the bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

At the time, Afghanistan was under the Taliban rule. It had seen more than two decades of war and now under the Taliban it was having some semblance of peace for the first time. While the Taliban methods were unconventional and at times uncivilized, it may also be appreciated that they were able to bring calm to a war torn country at the time, and that counted.

Having identified Al Qaeda as the culprit, U.S. government approached the Taliban to hand over all Al Qaeda members including their leader, Osama Bin Ladin. The Taliban had longstanding relations with Osama Bin Laden, who was regarded as a friend of the Afghan people, firstly because he had participated with them shoulder to shoulder in the Russo-Afghan war, and secondly since he had funded the Taliban government generously in their times of need. At the time, the Muslim world in general, and the Taliban in particular viewed the American claims with suspicion, firstly because the claims came too soon after 9/11, i.e. within hours, as

if it had all been a setup, and secondly because previous American foreign policies were viewed as anti-Muslim. It was argued that if the sole superpower of the world was not proactively trying to resolve disputes in Muslim majority areas such as Palestine, Kashmir and Bosnia etc, then it was more being a part of the problem than the solution. The Muslim world in general felt frustrated and deceived by the American reluctance and inability to provide any evidence to support their allegations against Al Qaeda, and the overall U.S. threatening and warmongering stance also did not help. Certain corners saw it as just another Jewish or American attempt to keep the Muslim World in trouble.

Once turmoil, the Taliban initially refused to hand over Osama to the U.S. They were convinced that Osama neither had the resources, nor the necessary wherewithal to orchestrate an enormous operation like 9/11. It is fair to say that the Taliban government at the time had no idea about what Bin Laden had been up to, neither did they have any idea about what Al Qaeda was, just like the rest of the world. The Taliban may well have harbored anti-American sentiments in their hearts as they blamed the U.S. for most of their troubles, however, their objectives were never global, not even regional, only national. They believed that the U.S. had abandoned the Afghan people midstream after U.S. objectives had been met at the end of the Russo-Afghan war, and had knowingly allowed



The Falling Man

One of the most iconic and saddening photographs of 9/11, taken by Richard Drew, photographer of the Associated Press; it captures a man falling from the World Trade Center who was believed to be an employee at the World Restaurant which set atop the North Tower .

Afghanistan to spiral into a long drawn civil war which completely ruined the country.

Later, Taliban heeded a bit under international advise-cum-pressure, and asked the U.S. to provide them proof against the accused, expressing their willingness to organize a trial in Afghanistan or in a third country e.g. Pakistan. The U.S. at that time was not in a position or mood to listen to the demands of a country which in their eyes was a ragtag nation to say the best. It therefore insisted that Bin Laden and his allies be handed over to the U.S. without any *ifs* and *buts*. Extracts from a case study by Richard Kugler explain the situation as follows: ³

"On 20 September, President Bush, in an address to the Congress, demanded the Taliban deliver Bin Laden and destroy Al Qaeda bases. The same day, a grand council of over 1,000 Muslim clerics issued a fatwa, expressing sadness for the deaths in the 9/11 attacks, urging Bin Laden to leave their country and calling on the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to conduct an independent investigation to clarify the reality and prevent harassment of innocent people. The fatwa went on to warn that should the United States not agree with its decision and invade Afghanistan, jihad would become an order for all Muslims".

".....On 5 October, the Taliban offered to try bin Laden in an Afghan court, so long as the U.S. provided what it called "solid evidence" of his guilt. The U.S. government dismissed the request for proof as "request for delay or prevarication"

The nature of Pak-Afghan Relations

In the past, Pak-Afghan relations had had their fair share of ups and down, with more downs than ups. Relation between the states have been marred since the inception of Pakistan, with Afghanistan raising issues such as the *Durand Line*⁴ and *Pakhtunistan*⁵, opposing Pakistan's membership in the United Nations⁶, and increasing

³ TIME, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/richard-drew-falling-man>

⁴ Pakistan Afghanistan Relations, A Pakistani Narrative, PILDAT, Mr. Rahimullah Yousufzai, page 11, March 2011

⁵ Pakistan Afghanistan Relations, A Pakistani Narrative, PILDAT, Mr. Rahimullah Yousufzai, page 11, March 2011

⁶ Pakistan Afghanistan Relations, A Pakistani Narrative, PILDAT, Mr. Rahimullah Yousufzai, page 11, March 2011



Indian involvement in Afghanistan⁷, to name a few. The highs of this relationship came during the Afghan Jihad and the Taliban rule, as the Taliban, more so due to their Pashtun ethnic affinity with Pakistan maintained a visible tilt towards Pakistan. Pakistan's inclination towards the Taliban regime was deep-rooted. Firstly, Taliban were ethnically Pashtuns, and a vast population of Pashtuns lived on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, who paid only ceremonial respect to the border and moved across it with ease. Secondly, Taliban mostly comprised of the erstwhile *Afghan Mujahideen*, who had mostly spent time in Pakistan with their families settled in here, and had developed a kind of filial relation with Pakistan. Thirdly, Pak-Afghan relations before Taliban had mostly been turbulent and while Pakistan had troubled relations with India on the Eastern border, it could not afford troubled relations on its western border too.

⁷ Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post 9 / 11 era, Carnegie Papers, Fredric Grare, pages 11-13, October 2006

Pakistan's Decision to join the Coalition against Terror

In the week following 9 / 11, Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi and the then Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's premier intelligence agency) Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, met various American officials, including the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and the Secretary of State Colin Powell who asked for Pakistan's unconditional support in their operations against the Taliban. On 13 September, the U.S. formally sought Pakistan's consent and cooperation.

Pakistan found itself in a dilemma. On one hand, it had for the first time a friendly government in Afghanistan, which it had supported for some time, while on the other side was the sole super power who was out for revenge. Pakistan was under duress. The mantra of *with us or against us*, left little room for maneuvering. The decision to choose a side lay in the hands of the then President and Chief of Army Staff, General Pervaiz Musharraf. Musharraf had taken over the reins of the government in a coup d'état in October 1999, having removed the government of the then Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Shareef. It has been argued that had a political government been in control in Pakistan at the time of 9 / 11, Pakistan's fate would have been much different, much better, even if the decisions taken had been the same. This argument is based on the idea that a political government enjoys public support and that its decisions, though criticized, are largely owned up by the population, whereas a military ruler's decisions, irrespective of their strategic soundness, are unwelcomed by the masses. In words of the President, the U.S. made the following demands:

"Pakistan is being, asked to support this campaign. What is this support? Generally speaking, these are three important things in which America is asking for our help. First is intelligence and information exchange, second support is the use of our airspace and the third is that they are asking for logistic support from us."

*President General Pervaiz Musharraf,
Address to the nation, 19 September 2001⁸*

There was a lot of in-house discussion about the issue, however at the end, the decision was in favor of joining the U.S.

⁸ Pakistan's war on terror, IPRI factfile, page 1, Editor Dr Noor ul Haq, 2006.

in the War on Terror. Much debate has been done on the wisdom of this decision. As a nation, the people were largely against it. Firstly, because they were suspicious of all things American, given America's tainted track record during the 1965 & 1971 Indo-Pak wars, its abandonment of Pakistan and Afghanistan post Russo-Afghan war, imposition of sanctions on Pakistan after it went nuclear, and its general foot dragging on the Kashmir issue. Secondly, the U.S. government was not putting forward any evidence substantiating its allegations against Osama, Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, and mostly behaved as a school bully just wanting to have its way. And thirdly, Pakistani's considered Afghans as their socio-religious brethren and were therefore out rightly against any action against them. The dictatorial nature of Musharraf's government was also no help. One needs to understand the environment / conditions within which Pakistan decided to join the U.S. bandwagon:

- Firstly, like most of the countries, Pakistan at the time lacked the strength and wherewithal to oppose the U.S.
- Secondly, Pakistan was concerned that India might take over the lead role, in turn developing stronger ties with the U.S. and may also take the opportunity of sandwiching Pakistan from both sides.
- Thirdly, Pakistan wanted the situation in Kashmir to be viewed by the world for what it was, i.e. a freedom struggle and a long overdue international obligation of holding a plebiscite, and not for what India was trying to portray it to be i.e. Pakistani sponsored terrorism.
- Fourthly, Pakistan also eyed at making deals with the US in this garb to bolster its fragile economy, and get the sanctions imposed earlier on it, removed.

When viewed from the prism of above mentioned points, the decision to join the U.S. seems quite sound and strategic, however people may not always give priority to *soundness* and *stratagem* of the decisions, especially when these decisions involve matters of faith, tradition and relations. The opponents of this decision had other factors in mind, mostly stemming from emotional, ethnical and religious sentiments.

Differentiating between Al-Qaeda & Afghan Taliban

Here, one also needs to understand the difference between Afghan Taliban and Osama Bin Ladin's Al-Qaeda. Indeed these were two very different entities, and it can be argued that it was because of U.S.' reluctance to appreciate the difference between the two, that prolonged the war in Afghanistan for over a decade.

Al-Qaeda is an extremist organization with an international agenda. Most of its leadership is Arab, and non-Afghan. Osama and his followers were essentially disenchanted with the state of Palestinian, Afghan, Kashmiri, Bosnian and Chechen Muslims amongst others, which led Al-Qaeda's leadership to conclude that the western world, led by the U.S. was not only non-serious in its approach to solve these issues, it was rather guilty of conniving to keep these problems alive. They also blamed the Muslim governments of being inept, corrupt and anti-Islamic and decided to take matters in their own hands. Pakistan did not subscribe to Al-Qaeda's line of thinking.



MULLAH OMAR

OSAMA BIN LADIN

Afghan Taliban were altogether a different concept. They were born as a consequence of the long drawn Afghan Jihad and the

ensuing Civil War. They initially started off as local seminary teachers followed by their students, who having seen enough of lawlessness in their homeland and had decided to take the matters into their own hands. And they did reasonably succeed in establishing *order* in the war torn Afghan state within a short span. They did not have an international agenda. Pakistan completely supported the Taliban and was the first country to recognize their government once they took control of Kabul in 1996.

Operation Enduring Freedom

“Operation Enduring Freedom”⁹ was launched by American and British forces on 7 October 2001, less than a month after 9/11. The mere speed of identifying the culprits and the alacrity with which the forces were readied and arrayed and finally brought into Afghanistan led to many conspiracies, the leading one being that 9/11 had been an inside job and that explained how it became possible to undertake these steps so quickly.

On the ground, Allied forces were joined by the *Northern Alliance* also known as the *United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan* or *United Front*. In between, the U.S. and Northern Alliance objectives began to diverge. While the U.S. was continuing the search for Osama bin Laden, the Northern Alliance wanted to finish off the Taliban.


The first US troops to enter the country were the CIA’s Special Activities Division. Airstrikes were launched on Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Kabul fell a month later, on 13 November 2001. The Tora Bora Mountains lie roughly to the east of Kabul, near the Pak-Afghan border. American analysts believed that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had holed themselves up in fortified networks of caves and underground bunkers. The area was subjected to heavy B-52 bombardments.

On the night of 12 November, Taliban forces fled Kabul under cover of darkness. Northern Alliance forces arrived the following afternoon, encountering a group of about twenty fighters hiding in the city’s park. This group was killed in a 15-minute gun battle. Once these forces were neutralized, Kabul was in the hands of the coalition forces. The fall of Kabul started a cascading collapse of Taliban positions.

9 Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan : A case study of adaptation in Battle, Richard Kugler, page 3

As the bombardment at Tora Bora grew, the siege of Kunduz was continuing. After nine days of fighting and bombardment, Taliban fighters surrendered to Northern Alliance forces on 25–26 November. On 20 December 2001, more than two months after the attack began, the UNSC authorized the creation of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security. Command of ISAF was passed on to NATO on 11 August 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq in March of that year.

It has been alleged that during November 2001, U.S. allowed the evacuation of a fair number of mostly volunteer fighters by air, from the city of Kunduz once it was surrounded by U.S. forces. It has also been alleged that taking advantage of the situation, top Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership also got evacuated to Chitral and Gilgit. Thus the airlift received the name of *Airlift of Evil*. These claims were made by investigative journalists, however both U.S. and Pak authorities have denied any such airlift.



Operation Enduring Freedom was followed by fighting in *Tora Bora mountains* which eventually led to the largest U.S. ground operation in Afghanistan i.e. *Operation Anaconda*¹⁰, fought from 2-18 March 2002, in the Shahikot valley. Initially conceived as a three day operation, it lasted for 17 days, and played a critical role in defining how international forces would fight, there onwards.

U.S. operations in Afghanistan progressed with great speed and the war drew to a close within months. Understandably so, because of the extreme technological ascendancy that the U.S. enjoyed over its adversaries. Afghans were poor people whose country had already seen tremendous destruction in the preceding three decades. They lacked the basic wherewithal to oppose the U.S. military might, their audacity however remains commendable.

As the fighting progressed many Afghans left the area and moved over to the tribal areas of adjoining Pakistan. Cross border movement had never been a concern and was as free as walking from one town to another. It is alleged that senior Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership also moved to FATA during this time. Though U.S. and Pakistani authorities initially did consider sealing the border, however they decided to leave it as a bad job, considering the length of the border, vis-à-vis the resources required, a decision both would later regret.

¹⁰ Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan : A case study of adaptation in Battle, Richard Kugler, page 1

¹¹ Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/centcom-map2.htm>

CHAPTER

2

THE RISE OF TERROR - PRE TTP PERIOD


As pointed out earlier, in the early days of the war the Pakistani people were by and large reluctant to consider the 'war on terror' as their own. Many felt that they had been dragged into someone else's war against their own Muslim brethren. The absence of evidence, linking Taliban with 9/11 was the main cause for this thinking. Many blamed Musharraf of selling out his Muslim brethren in an attempt to consolidate his position in the corridors of power. Many were of the opinion that he was aligning himself with infidels in the foretold *Armageddon* and would do anything to appease his foreign masters. Indeed many thought that the end of the world was near and this would turn out to be the final battle between good and evil, right and wrong.

In 2001-02, a number of important Al Qaeda leaders were arrested in Pakistan, some in the northern areas adjoining Afghanistan, while others as far down south as Karachi. Terrorist response was almost immediate. The country started to rock with terror incidents throughout its length and breadth; terrorists demanding the government to disassociate itself from the U.S. led the war on terror. The capture of important Al Qaeda figures such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Ramzi Bin Al Shabih kept Pakistan at the center stage of the war on terror. Religious parties opposed siding with the U.S. while few volunteer fighters also proceeded from Pakistan to Afghanistan. During this time, two assassination attempts were made against President Musharraf in Rawalpindi. An attack was also launched on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz during an official visit to Attock. Almost all terrorist activities were traced back to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), meriting deployment of the Army in areas which had only seen Frontier Corps (FC) till that time.

Understanding FATA

The term “Federally Administered Tribal Areas” or FATA refers to the combination of seven *tribal areas*¹ (Khyber, Bajaur, Mohmand, Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan & South Waziristan Agencies) and four *frontier regions* (Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Tank & Dera Ismail Khan) located in the north west of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The area served as a buffer zone during ‘The Great Game’ between Tsarist Russia and British India. It formed part of Pakistan at the country’s independence.

As per 2017 census FATA’s population stood at 5 million, with a population growth rate of 2.2 %, comprising mostly of Sunni muslims. People are subdivided into 60 tribes² and 400 sub clans. The main tribes settled in these areas include the Wazir and Dawar tribes in North Waziristan Agency, Mehsuds and Wazirs in South Waziristan Agency, Tarkanis and Uthmankhels in Bajaur, Afridis and Shinwaris in Khyber, Bangash in Kurram, Orakzais in Orakzai and Mohmands in Mohmand Agency.³



1 Understanding FATA – 2011, Volume V, Mr. Naveed Ahmed Shinwari, Executive Summary, page XI-XIII

2 Understanding FATA – Oct – Dec 2010, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, page

3 <http://fatada.gov.pk/interactive-map-of-fata/>

The area is separated from Afghanistan by the international border (Durand line) since 1893, which emerged as a consequence of the 2nd Afghan War and was signed between Amir Abd-ur-Rehman and Sir Mortier Durand. While this line resulted in splitting the Pashtuns between Afghanistan and British India, locals paid no heed to the demarcation, and business continued as usual, to and fro Afghanistan.

The area was governed under the *Frontier Crimes Regulations* 1901 (FCR), was managed by the Governor of KPK, and fell under the *Ministry of States & Frontier Regions* or *SAFRON*. The government had appointed a *Political Agent (PA)* for each agency assisted by *Tehsildars*. The PA in turn appointed *Maliks* from the local tribes who represented their communities. Livelihood opportunities⁴ were few and mostly related to agriculture, small trade and livestock rearing.

Pashtunwali⁵ is the pre-Islamic Pashtun code of conduct regulating the society. Honor and chivalry occupy a central theme in this tradition, along with undying loyalty to the tribe, and fierce opposition to external occupation. This code consists of core elements of *Nang* (honor), *Badal* (revenge), *Melmastia* (hospitality), *Nanawatay* (sanctuary or protection) and *Hamsaya* (neighbor).

The area has seen battles since the times of Alexander the Great and remained on the center stage during the *Russo-Afghan War*, followed by the *Afghan Civil War* and the ongoing *Global War On Terror*. Before Zarb-e-Azb, the area allegedly attracted all known international factions of terrorists, especially *Al-Qaeda*, *Afghan Taliban* and *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*.

Indo-Pak Military Escalation of 2002

December 2001 saw a new turning of tables when a group of 5 terrorists attacked the Indian parliament resulting in the death of 15 individuals including the terrorists. The Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha sessions had adjourned a mere 40 minutes before the attack and many parliamentarians were still present within the premises. This was a serious attack on India's solidarity and prestige. India was quick to point its fingers towards *Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)*, and *Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)* insinuating Pakistani involvement, and

⁴ Understanding FATA – 2011, Volume V, Mr. Naveed Ahmed Shinwari, Executive Summary, page XI-XIII

⁵ Understanding FATA – Oct – Dec 2010, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, page 2

started amassing its forces on the Indo-Pak border to 'teach Pakistan a lesson'. Pak forces responded in time and a full fledged war was averted due to timely occupation of battle positions by Pakistani troops, rendering any Indian aggression non-profitable. Forces of both the countries remained deployed along the border, 'eyeball to eyeball' throughout the year, up until foreign powers intervened and forced both the countries to pull back their forces to peacetime locations.

The timing of the 2002 Indo-Pak escalation had been especially challenging for Pakistan as it faced trouble on both eastern and western borders. Some analysts argued that the attack on the Indian parliament had been orchestrated by RAW (Research and Analysis Wing – India's premier Intelligence Agency), to exploit Pakistan's vulnerability at the time, offered by the precarious situation at its western borders.

Nevertheless the 2002 escalation had put Pakistan in a precarious situation. It had initially picked up troops from its Indo-Pak border and re-deployed them on the Pak-Afghan border, when the war on terror had commenced. The attack on Indian Parliament and the Indian Military buildup thereafter forced Pakistan to pull out troops from the Pak-Afghan border to regain balance against the Indian designs. This situation attracted attention of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan who wanted Pakistani forces to seal the Pak-Afghan border while they carried out operations within Afghanistan. International pressure thus forced the Indian forces to move back to peace time locations.

Operation Al Mizan (Justice / Balance)⁶

Operation Al Mizan is a blanket reference to all military actions, deployments and operations undertaken between 2002 and 2006 in which approximately 70,000-80,000 troops, belonging mostly to the Army's 11 Corps and the Frontier Corps (FC KPK) participated. Al-Mizan was conducted in the tribal areas (mostly SWA) to flush out foreign fighters who were becoming a threat to peace and security of Pakistan. The operation was preceded by negotiations between government officials and local leaders or *maliks* to either voluntarily

6 Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, Seth Jones & Christine Fair, RAND, 2010, pages 46-56

hand over the foreign fighters or to indicate their locations and hideouts. Negotiations were followed by military operations. Many other smaller operations were conducted within the ambit of Al Mizan. These operations were however not without repercussions. While on one hand the army started to fathom the enormity and difficulty of the task at hand, on the other hand the scope of terrorist responses increased manifold. Terrorists were able to shift the battle field from the tribal areas to the settled districts.

In June 2004, reports surfaced of military operations launched against possible foreign fighters in Shakai valley with the cooperation of U.S. forces deployed across the border. Air Force and Combat Aviation were also used in these operations.

In the beginning, societal ownership of the war on terror was lacking, as it was perceived as a responsibility forced down on us by the U.S. and its western allies. The local populace was skeptical of military presence, did not welcome it and reflected on it as a violation of their tribal area status, which had allowed them to live a life free of military and other law enforcing agencies.

The Army was also cautious in its approach, so as not to annoy the locals. Much effort was taken up in establishing positions, camps and check posts, which had been non-existent previously. The military troops were not trained for such an environment. They were trained in the operations of war, but had no experience of fighting inland, in such a difficult mountainous terrain where it was difficult to differentiate between friends and foes in the marketplace or city-centers. Slowly but surely, the army geared itself for the new nature of operations it was going to face, alas, paying a heavy price.

During this time, a number of dialogues were held, and peace deals were cut with the militants, with a view to stabilize the situation, minimize civilian casualties and salvage those fighters who would still listen to reason. While these deals were hailed by certain corners, who were against fighting our own people in the first place, others were critical of the deals at various levels, e.g. some intellectuals argued that cutting deals with a group indicated the acknowledgment of that group's strength and legitimacy.

The Shakai Agreement⁷ (March 2004)

The *Shakai Agreement* was carved in March 2004, in a *Jirga* which included Commander 11 Corps Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, and militants led by Nek Mohammad Wazir, following the operations in Kalosha village. While the agreement should have ushered in peace, as was being contemplated, it actually proved to be counterproductive in that it gave time to the Taliban to gather strength and regroup themselves for future campaigns. Few Tribal elders also reflected negatively on it, as it circumvented the Jirga System in vogue.

Taliban took the agreement as a military surrender. A few days later, Nek Mohammad swore allegiance to Al Qaeda and was killed in a U.S. drone attack in June 2004, after which the agreement broke down. Another agreement was fostered in November 2004 but it was also short-lived.

President Musharraf's own comments⁸ about the deal during an interview, were as under:

"Question : The United States military was frustrated when they saw the approach you took through your corps commander, Safdar Hussein, in 2004 by negotiating deals with Taliban commanders. Was that a successful strategy?"

Answer : No, no, I think it didn't prove [effective], but one should never speak with hindsight. You have to apply all instruments -- military, political, administrative -- to succeed. Now, we thought if we reached an agreement, that would be the end of it; they will suppress it to peaceful means. Well, it proved wrong, because the people who got involved on the other side, they double-crossed. While they carried on with their own activities, the army, in fact, became a little complacent that we have reached an agreement. Then we reactivated the same process again. With hindsight one can see, well, that didn't prove to be correct."

⁷ Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, Seth Jones & Christine Fair, RAND, 2010, pages 51-53

⁸ Interview : Gen Pervaiz Musharraf, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/musharraf.html>

Sararogha Peace Deal⁹ – SWA – (February 2005)

As the disturbance spread in the SWA from Waziri tribesmen to Mehsud areas, the government opted to strike another peace deal with the militant leaders. On 22 February 2005, a government-sponsored Jirga struck a deal with Baitullah Mehsud, a pro-Taliban militant. The agreement brought in effect a ceasefire, and prohibited the harboring of foreign fighters. Compensations would be paid in return for the loss of property and life. It remained silent on the topic of cross border terrorism. The deal did not last long.

Miranshah Agreement¹⁰ (September 2006)

With time, the militancy spread from the Ahmedzai Wazirs of SWA to the Uthmanzai Wazirs of NWA. Writ of the government in the area was restricted to government buildings only. A peace deal was thus necessitated which was signed on 5 September 2006 between the government and the militants. The deal however received severe criticism internationally from various commentators. Sporadic engagement continued, and the deal was finally called off by the militants after the Lal Masjid episode.

The Chengai - Damadola Airstrike¹¹ (October 2006)

On 30 October 2006, an airstrike occurred on a madrassa (religious seminary) in village Chengai of Damadola, Bajaur. The strike led to the death of 82 students of the seminary including children. The strike gathered more attention than others, as the death toll was very high, and included children who had reportedly gathered for morning prayers and studies. There were some mixed reports about the presence of Aymen Al Zawahiri at the seminary.

The strike gathered a lot of negative attention and added fuel to the existing anti-U.S. & anti-Musharraf sentiment in the area. A minister and another Member of the National Assembly later resigned from their posts in protest. Terrorists also vowed revenge.

9 Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future, Sohail Habib Tajik, PIPS, January–March 2011, page 7.

10 Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future, Sohail Habib Tajik, PIPS, January – March 2011, page 7-8.

11 Dawn, 31 October 2006, <https://www.dawn.com/news/216918>



CHENGAI - DAMADOLA AIRSTRIKE

Tribesmen attending the funeral

Khyber Agency Pact (2008)

This pact was signed in Khyber Agency between Government of Pakistan and Laskhar-e-Islam led by Mangal Bagh. Salients of the pact included that LEAs would not be targeted, no incursions would be made into Peshawar or other settled districts, and no propaganda and training camps would be established in Khyber Agency against Pakistani authorities.

IMPORTANT PEACE DEALS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN & MILITANT GROUPS			
Serial	Dates	Peace Deals	Militants
1.	27 March 2004	Shakai Agreement	Nek Mohammad
2.	February 2005	Sararogha Agreement	Baitutllah Mehsud
3.	5 September 2006	Miran Shah Agreement	Militant groups in NWA including Hafiz Gul Bahadur
4.	June 2008	Khyber Agency Pact	Afridi Tribal Jirga
5.	20 April 2008	1 st Swat Agreement	TNSM led by Mullah Fazlullah
6.	21 May 2008	2 nd Swat Agreement	TNSM led by Mullah Fazlullah

CHAPTER

3

BIRTH OF TTP & SPREAD OF TERROR

The Global War on Terror started from Afghanistan, but later moved to Iraq amidst allegations that Saddam was preparing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). These allegations were later proved false. Operation Enduring Freedom subsequently spread to other Middle Eastern, African and Far Eastern Countries. The Afghan Taliban capitalized on the opportunity offered to them by diluted and distracted ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and commenced their campaign against ISAF forces and the Karzai-led Afghan government.

From 2001 to 2006, Pakistan continued to bear the brunt of the spillover of OEF in Afghanistan to its tribal areas, which slowly spread over to the settled districts. Authorities in Pakistan struggled to gather support for their operations. Public opinion remained split. Progress against terrorism was a mix of few successful military operations, reversals, peace deals, public protests and increasing international pressures to “do more”.

Post 2006, events took a turn for the worst. With the birth of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), terrorist groups in the country found an umbrella organization to cooperate under. Terror attacks skyrocketed and the law enforcement agencies struggled to fight the miscreants. National morale hit rock-bottom and talks about Pakistan’s failure as a state were common. No ray of hope could be seen at the end of the tunnel. However, the country successfully bounced back from oblivion and is the only country in recent history, which has been able to survive through such long drawn internal strife.

Operation Silence – The Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Saga

While terrorism existed in Pakistan before 2007, such incidents were few and far between. Lal Masjid was the watershed which gave a new direction and meaning to the war on terror in Pakistan.



LAL MASJID OPERATION

(JULY 2007)

Lal Masjid is a mosque-cum-seminary located in the heart of Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. It is spread over a large area and houses both male and female students in Jamia Faridia and Jamia Hafsa respectively. The story of Lal Masjid, its relationship with extremists and its political clout can be traced back to President Zia-ul-Haq's era. A graduate of Jamia Binoria Karachi, Maulana Abdullah was the first Khateeb (congregation leader) of Lal Masjid. The Khitabat (congregational leadership) later passed on to his two sons, Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi.



In 2007, Lal Masjid staff and students started to challenge the writ of the government by kidnapping people accused of un-Islamic activities, which included Chinese women allegedly

running a brothel, and setting up a parallel Sharia judicial system amongst other things. The implications are best described as under:

"They went around kidnapping people, including Chinese nationals. Now, where you kidnap Chinese nationals, you don't have the People's Daily writing an editorial on it; you have China's President making a telephone call. And it matters, because if there is one country that matters to Pakistan, it is China. After all, it is the single biggest investor, our most important friend, source of great sustenance and support over the years, and therefore that woke up the establishment as to what was happening in Islamabad".

Tariq Fatimi

At one point, the students took over a nearby library and declared the enforcement of *shariat* in the premises of Lal Masjid. Matters deteriorated on 3 July 2007 between the Lal Masjid administration and the government authorities, when a mob of Lal Masjid supporters shot and killed a Rangers personnel on a nearby picket. The ensuing gun battle led to the death of 9 others. Students burned a nearby building belonging to the Ministry of Environment and a few vehicles. Curfew was imposed in the area surrounding Lal Masjid and a deadline was laid for all those inside Lal Masjid to lay down their arms. The deadline was extended a number of times while Lal Masjid administration continued to send out a group of students each time the deadline drew nearer. The mosque leader, Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi was caught trying to escape in a *Burqa* (female gown covering the entire body and face). On 7 July, shots were fired on the aircraft of President Musharraf while it was taking off from the nearby Islamabad airport. Though no direct linkage was established with Lal Masjid, however the timings could not have been worse.

"Operation Silence", the military operation to clear Lal Masjid from militant hold was launched on 10 July 2007. Approximately 100 – 110 people were killed in the operation including 10 soldiers, while another 130 were injured. Lal Masjid operation was extensively covered by the international media and was reflected on as a test of Pakistan's commitment to fighting terror.

During the buildup to the operation, the local population started to get weary of the government's slow response to the

¹ Ambassador Tariq Fatemi on Pakistani politics after Lal Masjid, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 Aug 2007

situation. Most people wanted the government to undertake a military operation to bring an end to the drama which was embarrassing the whole country internationally. However as soon as the operation was undertaken and the casualty figures started to rise, public opinion took a U-turn and people protested strongly against the brutal use of force against young seminary students. Overnight, Ghazi brothers went from villains to heroes. Reports of the government trying to underplay the casualty figures went viral. That one event, deepened the divide between the liberals and the religious class, and caused irreparable damage to the country as a whole. Extremists around the globe drew mileage from the situation. Al Qaeda condemned the operation as barbaric and called on all Pakistani Muslims to join hands in their fight against the West, and its supporters such as Musharraf.

"Muslims of Pakistan: your salvation is only through Jihad. Rigged elections will not save you, politics will not save you, and bargaining, bootlicking, negotiations with the criminals and political maneuvers will not save you. Your salvation is only through Jihad, so you must now back the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with your persons, wealth, opinion and expertise, because the Jihad in Afghanistan is the door to salvation for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of the region²."

Ayemen Al Zawahiri

Deputy to Osama Bin Ladin

The birth of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

TTP states that its birth was a defensive reaction to the atrocities committed by US and Pakistani forces and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It maintains that though fighters from tribal areas started to fight against the U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan soon after 9/11, they never had any intentions to fight against the Pakistani authorities. In a video interview³, the TTP spokesman explains that it was the consequence of brutalities by Pakistani forces in Lal Masjid and elsewhere, that Taliban factions finally sat down together and forged an alliance against Pakistani forces at the end of 2007. In that pact, the various factions previously divided and limited to their own respective tribal agencies, decided

² The aggression against Lal Masjid, Ayemen Al Zawahiri

³ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ke Tareekh" (History of TTP), video on youtube.

that there onwards, an attack on any one faction would be considered an attack on all and no peace treaties could be signed by any one faction alone. It was also decided that the battle had to be taken out of the tribal area to Pakistan's settled areas, with a view to provide relief to the Afghan fighters, and to keep Pakistani forces at bay.

"The name "Tehrik-i-Taliban" had been used prior to the latest December 14 announcement. An organization with a similar name emerged in FATA's Orakzai Agency in 1998. Some reports also mention a similar organization by the name of Tehrik-i-Tulaba (Movement of Students) also operating in Orakzai Agency that even established an active Sharia court. The name and idea, therefore, is not original..... More recently, on 23 October, a credible newspaper in Pakistan disclosed that five militant groups joined hands to set up an organization named Tehrik-i-Taliban in Mohmand Agency with a goal "to flush out gangs carrying out criminal activities in the name of Taliban"..... Less than two months after this announcement, another group claiming to be Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan announced its formation. The December 14, 2007 announcement was viewed suspiciously in terms of authenticity, since it followed after the 23 October , 2007 announcement. It soon became clear, however, that the December 14 announcement was unique and alarming."

Hassan Abbas⁴

TTP Shura announced following objectives⁵ on its creation:

- Enforce Sharia, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform 'defensive jihad against the Pakistan Army'.
- React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District and North Waziristan Agency.
- Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area.
- Demand the release of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz.
- Refuse future peace deals with the Government of Pakistan.

The Ameer (chief) of TTP was Baitullah Mehsud, Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur was nominated as *Naib Ameer (deputy chief)*, and Maulana Faqir Mohammad as third in command, while the complete

⁴ Profile of Tehrik-s-Taliban Pakistan, CTC Sentinel, January 2008, Vol 1, Issue 2, pages 1-3

⁵ Profile of Tehrik-s-Taliban Pakistan, CTC Sentinel, January 2008, Vol 1, Issue 2, pages 1-3

Shura (executive council) comprised of 40 individuals from all tribal areas of FATA and a few from settled areas also. TTP is not merely a monolithic tribal pashtun outfit. In its folds, it carries Afghans, Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs and even Panjabi Taliban. While TTP initially gave 10 days to the government to adhere to its demands, it extended the deadline after the assassination of Ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was killed within days of the formation of TTP. The government later held TTP's leader Baitullah Mehsud responsible for the killing, a charge TTP denied on the grounds that attacking women was against their tribal culture.

TTP is Pakistan's hydra. It rocked the basic foundations of the country and drove fear deep down into every Pakistani individual. Its tactics were brutal, its targets well thought-out and its methods,



precise. It launched terrorist attacks immediately after its foundation which varied from attacks on the Army's General Headquarters and Naval & Air Bases, to attacks on public markets, hotels, mosques and foreign embassies. No corner of the country was safe. All was within

their reach. Pakistan's law enforcing agencies were not prepared for what was unleashed. They tried their best, but it was never good enough. Casualties continued to soar, attacks continued to increase in lethality and impact. Some argued that Pakistan was now reaping what it had sown for others in the past two decades. Pakistani Taliban also effectively established their parallel government in tribal areas by killing approximately 200 tribal elders on charges of being Pakistani or US spies. TTP methodology is best described as under:

*"Bombings, including suicide strikes, appear to be the group's preferred modus operandi, these being targeted especially at the Pakistani security forces and symbols of the state. Illegal FM radio channels and the circulation of DVD, CDs and pro-TTP newspapers and websites serve to promote the organization's propaganda campaign. Child recruitment appears common; certain Pakistani Taliban commanders bear a specific responsibility for training suicide bombers, and a significant amount of propaganda material is directed at young people. The role of Internally Displaced Persons as a possible recruitment pool for the TTP needs to be studied further. A myriad of financial sources swell TTP coffers, including criminal activity, 'protection money' and donations from sympathizers inside and outside of Pakistan In addition, a marked sectarian tinge has colored the TTP ideology, this most likely being due to the injection of leaders and cadres from sectarian backgrounds into the TTP. Although previously affiliated with religious political parties, TTP leaders now appear to have adopted a rigid anti-democracy stance. There has also been a growing reference to a 'global jihad' – either in relation to rescuing fellow Muslims from 'occupation,' spreading sharia, or avenging the growing US presence and drone attacks in Pakistan"*⁶

While the word "Taliban" is often loosely used to define all sorts of Muslim jihadists / extremists groups, there exist distinct differences within their folds, mostly based on their objectives and methodology. A Danish study⁷ has categorized the Taliban movement in Pakistan as under:

⁶ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan's North West, Danish Institute for International Studies Report, 2010, page 4-5

⁷ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan's North West, Danish Institute for International Studies Report, 2010, page 4-5

- **Mehsud Group.** The core conglomerate of the Tehrik-e-Taliban, including Baitullah Mehsud's group and his affiliates across FATA, as well as Maulana Fazlullah's Swat chapter, who have waged jihad against the Pakistani state.
- **Muqami Taliban.** Typically pro-government factions, including Maulvi Nazir (South Waziristan) and Gul Bahadur (North Waziristan), focused primarily on supporting the Afghan jihad.
- **Punjabi Taliban.** Factions of groups previously focused on sectarianism inside Pakistan or jihad in other places, now networking with TTP.
- **Niche Groups.** With specific ambitions, e.g. Ghazi Force, which sought revenge of the Lal Masjid attack, and was created by one of the Lal Masjid students' Fidaullah.

It is worth mentioning that while the TTP had professed its allegiance to the Afghan Taliban and their leader *Mullah Omar* from Day-1, yet the latter mostly tried to distance themselves from the war in Pakistan. Afghan Taliban were essentially fighting a U.S.-led occupationist force, and considered it not only a patriotic duty but also a religious calling. To them, fighting against the Government of Pakistan did not instil similar motivation. Overtime, the TTP hydra grew its relations with other international terrorist organizations, sectarian groups and jihadists, and started to threaten not only Pakistan's internal stability, but regional and global peace also.

The year 2009 saw the coming together of various warring factions of terrorist organizations under one umbrella when the TTP was joined by Maulvi Nazeer and Hafiz Gul Mohammad. Some thought of it as mere political maneuvering with an attempt to present a united front against U.S. announcements of increasing the forces in Afghanistan. The Council has not been heard of thereafter.

TTP's wave of Terror

Soon thereafter, TTP unleashed a reign of terror unparalleled in history. It rocked the very foundations of the state by brutal displays of beheadings, suicidal bombings, targeting of mosques, hospitals, schools and other civic amenities. The entire nation was

virtually locked up inside their houses. Not a month went by without appalling scenes of flesh, blood, smoke and cries on television. The nation was terrified. Those who could afford, started searching for greener pastures abroad. This was one of the most testing times in Pakistan's history.

There were real concerns about the future of the Pakistani state amongst the international community. Doomsday scenarios were drawn up by intellectuals and think tanks, such as an implosion leading to an Afghanistan-like civil war, or the capture of nuclear arsenal by the members of TTP etc. India also tried to draw mileage from the opportunity by projecting the indigenous Kashmiri freedom struggle as Pakistani sponsored terrorism and did win over some sympathies from the international community.

A list of 100 major terrorists' attacks has been compiled to remind the reader what mayhem Pakistan has been through since 9/11. The list includes only a 100 of the thousands of attacks, and does not include sectarian activities, attacks in Baluchistan or targeted killings in Karachi, which merit independent studies themselves. It is just a sample of what day to day life has been like in Pakistan and for its law enforcement agencies, who have managed to fight and survive through all this chaos in the hope of securing a better tomorrow for their future generations. It is an eye opener in its' self and no reader can remain unmoved by it. The list also shows the diverse kind of targets that the militants chose which included foreign embassies / consulates, military installations, government buildings, schools especially girls schools, hospitals, funerals, mosques at prayer times, Friday & Eid prayers, churches during Sunday masses, madaris etc.

100 major terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 9 / 11⁸

Serial	Date	Activity
2001		
1.	28 Oct	17 killed, 9 injured due to firing by 6 gunmen in a church in Model Town, Bahawalpur.
2002		
2.	8 May	14 killed, including 9 French, 34 injured due to a bomb explosion in a bus near Sheraton Hotel, Karachi.
3.	14 Jun	10 killed, 51 injured due to a car bomb explosion outside U.S. consulate, Karachi.
4.	13 Jul	12 killed, including 7 Germans during terrorist attack at an archeological site in Mansehra.
5.	4 Dec	3 killed in a bomb blast at the Macedonian Honorary Counsel General's Office, Karachi.
2003		
6.	14 Dec	Assassination attempt on President Musharraf, using an explosive device at Chaklala bridge, Jhanda Chichi, Rawalpindi.
7.	25 Dec	18 killed, 40 injured in 2nd assassination attempt on President Musharraf in Jhanda Chichi, Rawalpindi.
2004		
8.	22 Mar	13 soldiers killed, 22 injured as military convoy was ambushed in Wana, SWA.
9.	3 May	3 Chinese killed, 11 injured (including 9 Chinese) in a car bomb attack in Gawadar.
10.	10 Jun	11 killed (including 7 soldiers & 3 policemen), 12 injured in assassination attempt on Commander 5 Corps Lieutenant General Ahsan Saleem Hayat at Clifton Bridge, Karachi.
11.	30 Jul	7 killed in assassination attempt on Prime Minister-designate Shaukat Aziz in Fateh Jang.
2005		
12.	19 Mar	50 killed, 100 injured in a bomb explosion at a shrine in Jhal Magsi.
13.	27 May	25 killed, 100 injured in a bomb explosion at Bari Imam Shrine, Islamabad.
2006		
14.	11 Apr	57 killed, 200 injured in a suicidal attack at Nishtar Park, Karachi.

8 South Asian Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html>

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15.	8 Nov	42 killed, 39 injured in a suicidal attack on Army's Punjab Regimental Centre, Mardan.
2007		
16.	26 Jan	1 killed, 5 injured in suicidal attack on Marriott Hotel, Islamabad.
17.	6 Feb	1 killed, 10 injured in a suicidal attack in the car park of Islamabad Airport.
18.	20 Feb	Social Welfare Minister of Punjab, Zil-e-Huma Usman shot dead during an open court by a fanatic who considered it against Islamic teachings for a woman to be a minister.
19.	15 May	25 killed, 35 injured in a suicidal attack in Hotel Marhaba, Peshawar.
20.	10 Jul	70 killed, 130 injured during Lal Masjid operation.
21.	14 Jul	23 FC soldiers killed, 27 injured in a vehicle borne suicidal attack in Miranshah.
22.	15 Jul	47 killed, 100+ injured in suicidal attacks in Swat and DI Khan.
23.	17 Jul	16 killed, 63 injured in a suicidal attack on a Lawyer's rally in Islamabad.
24.	17 Jul	15 killed, several injured in a suicidal attack during night prayers at a mosque in Kohat Cantonment.
25.	27 Jul	15 killed, 53 injured in a suicidal attack on policemen at a restaurant, following clashes between police and Lal Masjid supporters, 500 meters from Lal Masjid, Islamabad.
26.	4 Sep	30 killed, 70 injured in twin suicidal attacks at Qasim Market and RA Bazaar, Rawalpindi targeting law enforcement personnel.
27.	4 Sep	20 killed, (mostly commandos) in a suicidal attack in Tarbela Ghazi.
28.	4 Oct	3 soldiers executed by Baitullah Mehsud, out of the 250 taken hostage a couple of months earlier.
29.	18 Oct	143 killed, 550 injured in suicidal attacks on the rally of ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
30.	24 Nov	32 killed, 55 injured in two suicidal attacks in Rawalpindi, one at ISI office at Hamza base, other at a check post near GHQ.
31.	4 Dec	1 killed in first female suicidal attack in Peshawar.
32..	21 Dec	60 killed, 80 injured in a suicidal attack during Eid prayers at Charsadda.
33.	27 Dec	30 killed, 100 injured in a suicidal attack during an election campaign rally in Rawalpindi.

2008		
34.	10 Jan	24 killed including ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 80 injured in a suicidal attack outside Lahore High Court.
35.	15 Jan	62 killed including 22 soldiers, as 600-700 terrorists over ran Sararogha Fort.
36.	4 Feb	8 killed, 10 injured in a bomb attack on a bus carrying security personnel in The Royal Artillery Bazaar, Rawalpindi.
37.	22 Feb	14 killed, 13 injured in a bomb attack at a wedding procession in Swat.
38.	25 Feb	8 killed, including the Surgeon General of Pakistan Army Lieutenant General Mushtaq Baig in a suicidal attack in Rawalpindi.
39.	29 Feb	40 killed, 75 injured in a suicidal attack at a funeral in Swat.
40.	2 Mar	42 killed, 58 injured in a suicidal attack at a Peace Jirga in Darra Adam Khel.
41.	4 Mar	8 killed, 24 injured in a twin suicidal attack on Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.
42.	11 Mar	30 killed, 200 injured in suicidal attacks on FIA Headquarters and an advertising agency in Lahore.
43.	15 Mar	One killed, 15 injured (mostly diplomats) in a bomb blast at the Luna Caprese Italian Restaurant, Islamabad.
44.	18 May	13 killed, 23 injured in a suicidal attack on the Punjab Regimental Centre, Mardan.
45.	2 Jun	8 killed, 30 injured in a vehicle borne suicidal attack on the Danish Embassy, Islamabad.
46.	6 Jul	20 killed, 40 injured in a suicidal attack targeting policemen deployed at a rally observing the 1st anniversary of the Lal Masjid operation in Melody Market, Islamabad.
47.	21 Aug	70 killed in a twin suicidal attack on Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) Wah Cantonment.
48.	20 Sep	60 killed, 200 injured in a suicidal attack on Marriott Hotel ,Islamabad.
49.	10 Oct	85 killed, 200 injured in a vehicle borne suicidal attack on a Jirga in Orakzai Agency.
50.	7 Dec	One killed, 2 injured, 171 vehicles burnt, including 62 armored personnel carriers by 300 attackers on Ring Road, Peshawar.
51.	8 Dec	53 NATO vehicles burnt on the outskirts of Peshawar.
52.	28 Dec	43 killed in a vehicle borne suicidal attack in a polling station in Buner.

BIRTH OF TTP & SPREAD OF TERROR

2009		
53.	3 Mar	7 killed, 20 injured in an attack on the Sri Lankan Cricket Team in Lahore.
54.	25 Apr	12 killed, 4 injured (all children between 4-12 years) by a toy bomb in Lower Dir.
55.	27 May	27 killed, 326 injured in a vehicle borne suicidal attack near ISI and Police offices in Lahore.
56.	5 Jun	49 killed in a suicidal attack during prayers at a mosque in Upper Dir.
57.	9 Jun	17 killed, 60 injured by a truck bomb attack on Pearl Continental Hotel, Peshawar.
58.	27 Aug	22 soldiers killed, 10 injured at aftari (time to break the fast) in a suicidal attack at Torkham, Khyber Agency.
59.	5 Oct	5 killed in a suicidal attack on the United Nations World Food Program Office, Islamabad.
60.	9 Oct	49 killed, 90 injured in a vehicle borne suicidal attack in Khyber Bazaar, Peshawar.
61.	10 Oct	6 killed, including a Brigadier and a Lieutenant Colonel in an attack on GHQ, Rawalpindi.
62.	28 Oct	117 killed, 200 injured in a bomb blast in a Meena Bazaar in Peshawar.
63.	2 Nov	35 killed, 63 injured in a suicidal attack near a bank in Rawalpindi, targeting military personnel drawing their salaries.
64.	4 Dec	40 killed, 86 injured during a terrorist attack including suicidal attackers during Friday prayers at the Parade Lane Mosque, Rawalpindi. A serving Major General, a Brigadier a Colonel and 2 Lieutenant Colonels were amongst those killed.
65.	7 Dec	38 killed, 100 injured in two bomb blasts at Moon Market, Lahore.
2010		
66.	1 Jan	90 killed in a vehicle borne suicidal attack during a volleyball match in Lakki Marwat.
67.	17 Apr	44 killed, 77 injured in a suicidal attack by 2 burqa-clad attackers in an IDP camp in Kohat.
68.	28 May	95 killed, 92 injured in a terrorist attack including suicidals' on an Ahmadiya mosque in Lahore.
69.	1 Jul	44 killed, 175 injured in three suicidal attacks at Data Darbar, Lahore.

BIRTH OF TTP & SPREAD OF TERROR

70.	9 Jul	65 killed, 110 injured in twin suicidal attacks in Mohmand Agency.
71.	6 Dec	45 killed, 70 injured in twin suicidal attacks at a Jirga in Mohmand Agency.
72.	25 Dec	45 killed, 80 injured in a female suicide attack at World Food Program Office, Khar, Bajaur Agency.
2011		
73.	10 Feb	31 killed, 42 injured in a suicidal attack on Army Recruitment Centre, Mardan.
74.	9 Mar	43 killed, 52 injured in a suicidal attack at a funeral in Peshawar.
75.	13 May	90 killed, including 73 paramilitary personnel in twin suicidal attacks near FC Training Centre, Charsadda.
76.	22 May	10 killed, 15 injured in attack on Mehran Naval Base, including destruction of two P-3C Orion planes.
77.	15 Sep	45 killed, 63 injured in a suicidal attack on a funeral in Lower Dir.
2012		
78.	15 Dec	7 killed, 40 injured in a militant attack on the PAF Base in Peshawar Airport.
79.	29 Dec	22 Levies executed by TTP, three days after being abducted in FATA.
2013		
80.	17 May	21 killed, 120 injured during bomb blasts at 2 mosques in Malakand.
81.	15 Jun	24 killed, 27 injured (mostly females, also including Deputy Commissioner Quetta) when terrorists blew up a Women University bus, followed by a bomb blast in Bolan Medical College, Quetta.
83.	18 Jun	35 killed, 57 injured including an MPA in a suicidal attack on a funeral in Mardan.
84.	23 Jun	11 killed (including 10 foreign tourists) during a militant attack on the base camp of Nanga Parbat.
85.	29 Jul	24 killed during TTP attack on Central Prison at D I Khan.
86.	15 Sep	3 killed, including a Major General and a Lieutenant Colonel in an IED explosion in Upper Dir.
87.	22 Sep	83 killed, 145 injured in twin suicidal attacks at All Saints Church, Qissa Khwani Bazaar, Peshawar.
88.	29 Sep	42 killed, 100 injured in a car bomb blast in Qissa Khwani, Peshawar.

BIRTH OF TTP & SPREAD OF TERROR

2014		
89.	1 Mar	12 security personnel providing security to Polio Workers killed in two bomb blasts in Khyber Agency.
90.	9 Apr	23 killed in bomb blast in Pir Wadhai, near Sabzi Mandi, Islamabad.
91.	8 Jun	33 killed during a terrorist attack on the Jinnah International Airport, Karachi.
92.	2 Nov	61 killed, 150 injured in a suicidal attack at Wagah border, Lahore.
93.	16 Dec	150 killed, including 134 children in a militant attack, including suicidal attack by seven attackers at the Army Public School, Peshawar.
2015		
94.	15 Mar	15 killed, 70 injured in twin suicide bombings on 2 churches in Lahore.
95.	16 Aug	20 killed including provincial home minister Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Shuja Khanzada, 23 injured in a twin suicidal attack in Attock.
96.	29 Dec	26 killed, 50 injured in a suicidal attack at NADRA office Mardan.
2016		
97.	20 Jan	21 killed, 35 injured in militant attack on Bacha Khan University, Charsadda.
98.	27 Mar	74 killed, 300 injured in a suicidal attack in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park, Lahore, during Easter Celebrations.
99.	8 Aug	74 killed, 100 injured in a suicidal attack in Quetta Civil Hospital.
100.	16 Sep	36 killed, 37 injured in a suicidal attack at Friday Prayers in Mohmand Agency.
101.	12 Nov	52 killed, 102 injured in a bomb blast at the shrine of Shah Norani, Khuzdar.
2017		
102.	21 Jan	25 killed, 87 injured in a bomb blast in Sabzi Mandi, Parachinar.
103.	13 Feb	14 killed, 85 injured in suicidal attack near Punjab Assembly, Lahore.
104.	16 Feb	88 killed, 343 injured in suicidal attack on Shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Jamshoro.
Note. Terrorist activities as part of the Baluchistan Conflict, emanating from sectarian issues, and those resulting as political or criminal activities in Karachi have been excluded from this list.		

TEN PERPETRATOR GROUPS WITH THE MOST ATTACKS WORLDWIDE IN 2012⁹				
<i>Serial</i>	Name	Attacks	Killed	Average Number Killed per Attack
1.	Afghan Taliban	525	1842	3.51
2.	Boko Haram	364	1132	3.11
3.	Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	249	892	3.58
4.	Maoists (India)/ Communist Party of India-Maoist	204	131	0.64
5.	Al-Shabaab	121	278	2.30
6.	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	108	282	2.61
7.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	103	510	4.95
8.	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	80	83	1.04
9.	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	71	122	1.72
10.	Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	58	0	0.00

⁹ Annex of Statistical Information, Country Report on Terrorism 2012, START, May 2013, page 7.

CHAPTER

4

FIGHTING TERROR

The year 2007 was an exceptionally tumultuous year in Pakistan's recent history. It saw political and administrative turmoil throughout the length and breadth of the country. Highlights of 2007 include *deposing of the Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudry* and the ensuing *Movement for the Restoration of Judiciary*, the *12 May riots* which led to the killing of 50 people and immense infrastructural damage in Karachi, *Imposition of Emergency Rule* by Pervaiz Musharraf, *U.S. sanctions* against inconsistencies of Pakistan's nuclear program, *return of both Nawaz Shareef and Benazir Bhutto* to Pakistan and *Musharraf's re-election as President* despite 80 MPAs resigning in protest to his candidacy. Law and order also touched its lowest ebb with the *Lal Masjid operation* in mid-2007, the *birth of TTP*, *assassination of ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto*, *attack on Marriott Hotel Islamabad*, *military operation in Mir Ali / FATA*, *sectarian clashes in Kurram Agency*. *Foreign investment and tourism* fell down to an all time low.

The situation was so bad that the only ways forward were either a *complete implosion* or to *fight back the challenges* with full force and resolve. Luckily, the country chose the latter. Thereafter started a series of military operations with full public support, against terrorist strongholds. The country also lost its ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to terrorism during this time. Ensuing pages touch upon the major operations carried out by the armed forces. Successes commenced from Swat and then spread to the remaining tribal and settled areas.

Operation Rah-e-Haq I & II - Swat (2008)

Situated between Chitral, Dir, Kohistan, Shangla and Buner districts, the beautiful valley of Swat, was once called the *Switzerland*

of the East, by the visiting Queen Elizabeth II. Saidu Sharif, Mingora, Kalaam, Bahrain and Madyun are the major towns of Swat valley. A historically rich valley, it has seen the likes of Alexander the Great traverse through it. Many remains of early Buddhists era have also been found in Swat. The state acceded to Pakistan in 1947 and retained much of its borders and the stately apparatus till it was finally merged in the mainland in 1969.

Swati people led a reasonably satisfied life under the rule of the Wali-e-Swat and expected better in Pakistan. However, some of the people's demands were not timely met, especially those related to establishment of an Islamic system of governance, and speedy dispensation of justice. Government's slow pace towards meeting these demands led to disenchantment, and created room for extremist elements.

This disenchantment left room for the creation of the Sufi Mohammad-led TNSM (Tehrik-e-Nifaaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi) in the 90's. Overtime, leadership of TNSM shifted from Sufi Mohammad to his son-in-law cum nephew, Mullah Fazlullah. Rabia Zafar explains the reasons for the rise of Taliban in Swat as under:

*"..... according to many experts, the real issue in Swat was a crisis of governance. The Taliban gained the support of the local people by filling an institutional vacuum. The need for effective governance was so great that local people were willing to overlook the Taliban's harsh tactics and particularly rigid interpretation of Islamic law. This allowed the Taliban to operate as a legitimate political entity at that time and again challenged the authority of the provincial and federal governments."*¹

Earlier, extremist elements in Swat had faced three military operations. The first was a short lived Frontier Corps led operation in 1995, which culminated into a deal, within which the government agreed to limited enforcement of Shariat. A second military operation was undertaken in 2007, once the Taliban (now led by Sufi Mohammad's son-in-law, Fazlullah) declared Jihad against Pakistan Army in retaliation to the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) episode. The third operation was undertaken at the end of 2008, which culminated

¹ Development and the Battle for Swat, Rabia Zafar, Al-Nakhlah, The Fletcher School online Journal for issue related to South West Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring 2011, page 4.

into the signing of the Nizam-e-Adal regulation in February 2009, through which most of the Taliban demands were met.

Rabia Zafar argues that all would have been well after that, had the Taliban not made a few miscalculations. Firstly, they made belligerent public statements declaring the constitution, parliament and democracy un-islamic. Secondly, a viral video of public flogging of a woman led to nationwide uproar and international condemnation. And thirdly, Sufi Mohammad and Fazlullah started to spread their influence into the surrounding areas of Dir, Buner, Shangla and Malakand, which became unacceptable for the state. TNSM also started forceful implementation of their version of sharia, which included burning of CD shops, denying education to girls by destroying their schools, threatening barbers against trimming people's beards, administering public punishments, including public flogging of women accused of adultery, killing opponents and hanging their bodies in the city center to spread terror amongst people etc. *The Green Chowk* became known as the *Red Chowk* due to the ghastly beheadings and hangings of dead bodies in that location.

Government's writ was being directly challenged. Internationally, Pakistan's situation was being viewed with concern. The skewed outlook of TTP Swat chapter is evident from the following extract:

*"Fazlullah's group has also opposed polio vaccine campaigns, denying immunization to thousands of children in the area. Fazlullah convinced his followers that the U.S.-manufactured polio drops are part of a conspiracy to sterilize Pakistanis and reduce the Muslim population. Fazlullah further declared that those dying of polio are 'martyrs' for they have refused to take a vaccination that consists of haram or 'forbidden' materials."*²

The TTP in Swat tried to provide an alternate form of government to the local populace. Commander Hafizullah had publicly said:

"We have built roads [for the Swati people] where in over 60 years the government could not. The locals are happy with us. They no longer need to pay tax to the government. We have

² Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan's North West, Danish Institute for International Studies Report, 2010, page 41

built pipelines and provided water to the people..... Also we resolved decade-long rivalries that had been going on and on which the government failed to bring about a solution. The Taliban have appointed ulema to solve these cases and bring peace. Wherever they [the army] have gone, they have committed atrocities, killing children and the elderly, who have nothing to do with the Taliban. And they have looted their homes, stealing anything that is remotely valuable.”³

In end 2007, Pakistan Army commenced a series of military operations against the Swat Taliban, which were sporadically spread over the next two years. These included *Raah-e-Haq 1* (October – December 2007), *Raah-e-Haq 2* (July 2008), *Raah-e-Haq 3* (January 2009), and the final blow was served to the Taliban during *Operation Raah-e-Raast* (May 2009).

TABLE – 1
MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN WITHIN
PAKISTAN^{4,5}

Serial	Name	Location	Year
1.	<i>Operation Enduring Freedom</i>	FATA	2001 – 2002
2.	<i>Operation Al Mizan</i>	FATA	2002 – 2006
3.	<i>Operation Rah-e-Haq I, II & III</i>	Swat	2008 – 2009
4.	<i>Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem, Diraghlum, Bia Diraghlum & Khwakh Ba De Shum</i>	Khyber Agency	2008 – 2009
5.	<i>Operation Sher Dil</i>	Bajaur Agency	2008
6.	<i>Operation Zalzal</i>	SWA	2008
7.	<i>Operation Brekhna</i>	Mohmand Agency	2009
8.	<i>Operation Rah-e-Raast</i>	Swat	2009
9.	<i>Operation Raah-e-Nijaat</i>	SWA	2009
10.	<i>Operation Toor Tunder</i>	Buner, Lower Dir, Shangla	2009
11.	<i>Operation Koh-e-Sufaid</i>	Kurram Agency	2011
12.	<i>Operation Zarb-e-Azb</i>	NWA & throughout the country	2014 – 2016
13.	<i>Operation Khyber I, II & III</i>	Khyber Agency	2014-2016
14.	<i>Operation Radd-ul-Fassad</i>	Throughout the country	Jan 2017 onwards

³ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan's North West, Danish Institute for International Studies Report, 2010, page 41

⁴ Liverostrum, <https://www.liverostrum.com/pakistan-army-operations/1025510.html>

⁵ Dawn, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1112980>

Operation *Raah-e-Haq 1 & 2* led to a peace deal struck between the provincial government and the Taliban, and an uneasy peace ensued. Most stakeholders, especially the U.S. were skeptical of the peace deal and considered it to be counterproductive as it was thought that the Taliban would regroup and return to the battle field. Taliban indeed took advantage of the time window made available by the peace pact and re-entered Swat, where smaller skirmishes gained pace. Operation *Rah-e-Haq 3* was launched in January 2009, during which security forces gained considerable grounds. However, the government reached yet another deal with the Taliban, released Sufi Mohammad and announced the enforcement of Shariat in Malakand and Swat districts through the *Nizam-e-Adal Regulations, 2009*.

Peace however was again short-lived. Both sides blamed each other for its failure. While the government blamed Taliban for continuing with terrorist activities and expanding their presence into the neighboring districts of Swat, Taliban on the other hand blamed the government of continuing military operations against them, and acting against the Nizam-e-Adal Regulation by granting the right to appeal to the Supreme Court against verdicts issued by the Shariat Courts.

Operation Toor Tunder^{6,7}- Buner, Lower Dir & Shangla (2009)

Taliban's spread into the neighbouring districts of Swat, some of which were within 60 miles of the capital Islamabad, raised alarm bells internationally. The provincial government of KP led by Awami National Party (ANP) had sent the text of the Peace deal / Nizam-e-Adal Regulation for the approval of the President Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who delayed signing the deal till absolute peace was installed. That was not to be and within days, the ceasefire was violated by the Taliban by establishing road blocks against government and FC movements and attacking security forces. To this end, *Operation Black Thunderstorm or Toor Tundar* was launched first in Lower Dir, then Buner and later into other areas in April 2009. The operation was successful and militants were flushed

⁶ The Nation, 4 May 2009, <https://nation.com.pk/04-May-2009/troops-consolidate-positions-in-Buner>

⁷ The Sunday Morning Herald, 29 April 2009, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/pakistan-mounts-ground-air-of-fensive-in-buner-military-20090429-am6i.html>

out from the entire area. Foreign fighters including Libyan and Syrians had also been caught in the area.

Operation Raah-e-Raast⁸ - Swat (May 2009)

Operation Raah-e-Raast began in May 2009. It commenced with operations in the town of Mingora, which was retaken between 24-30 May 2009. Mingora was followed by Malam Jabba, Peochar and Bahrain, where intense street fighting erupted between security forces and Taliban, forcing local populace to vacate the area numbering in hundreds of thousands. A large number of Special Forces including Naval forces participated in this operation. As the Taliban moved towards the Upper Dir district, local militias or *Lashkars* were formed by the locals, which fought them off.

Taliban leaders including Muslim Khan were also captured, while Mullah Fazlullah was wounded in airstrikes but later managed to escape and become the leader of TTP. Few Uzbek, Libyan, and Saudi nationals were also caught. Afghan and Indian links had also been traced. Fighting was followed by the rehabilitation of the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), which was a massive crisis within itself.

Operation Rah-e-Raast was a complete success in that not only were the militants defeated and the valley cleared, but the 2 million or so displaced people were brought back to their homes safely.

Operation Sher Dil⁹ – Bajaur Agency (September 2008)

Bajaur, though the smallest of the agencies was significant nonetheless, as a major route to Afghanistan passed through it from the location of Loisam. In 2008, the militants started to gain the upper hand in this agency by taking over check posts and launching suicidal attacks. On 7 August 2008, a *Frontier Corps* (FC) convoy, enroute to Loisam was ambushed by Taliban reported in hundreds. Taliban had the upper hand in battle that day, killing tens of FC troops, capturing many soldiers and vehicles. The remaining FC troops broke the cordon and retreated to their earlier position at Khaar.

⁸ Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, Seth Jones & Christine Fair, RAND, 2010, pages 67-68

⁹ Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, Seth Jones & Christine Fair, RAND, 2010, pages 62-65

Operation Sherdil was launched a few days later by FC troops, supported by regular army troops under the leadership of Commander 11 Corps Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain and Inspector General Frontier Corps Major General Tariq Khan, an officer known for his courage and for transforming FC into a potent force. *Lashkars* especially the Salarzai tribe, actively took part in the fight. Bulk of the area was cleared from Taliban by the end of the year, while smaller operations carried on till 2010, when the important town of *Damadola* was finally wrested from Taliban control. The operation led to the death of some 1000 militants and 63 security personnel. Amongst other discoveries, the Army also found a large and sophisticated network of caves and tunnels in the area which was used by the militants for covert movements.

Operation Zalzala¹⁰ – SWA – (2008-09)

Operation Zalzala (earthquake) followed the collapse of the *Sararogha* Peace Deal between GoP and Baitullah Mehsud. The major events leading to Zalzala included the abduction of Pakistani soldiers in August 2007, the capture of Sararogha Fort and killing of troops by militants, even though a peace deal was in vogue.

Operation Zalzala was launched in January 2008 as part of *Operation Tri-Star*, in which FC, Army's 14th Division¹¹, and PAF elements participated. The operation was preceded by dropping of leaflets encouraging local populace to evacuate the area. Militants were attacked at various places including Spinkai and Kotkai. One of the key targets was Qari Hussain Mehsud who was incharge of training suicidal attackers.

Kinetic operations came to a close by May 2008, and the military fortified its positions in the SWA. A large amount of weapons, primed suicidal jackets, bomb factories, computers and hate literature were captured from the area. IDP figures crossed 200,000 leading to a humanitarian crisis. In the end, despite operations, the militants crept back into the area and reportedly Qari Hussain Mehsud reinitiated his suicidal school that the Army had earlier closed down. Collective punishments and collateral damage sowed the seeds for hate and revenge amongst the locals.

¹⁰ Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, Seth Jones & Christine Fair, RAND, 2010, pages 56-62

¹¹ Taliban ousted, But Spinkai is now a ghost town, <https://www.dawn.com/news/303444>

Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem¹² – Khyber Agency (2008)

While militancy was not new to Khyber Agency, yet TTP had never established a foothold in the area. Khyber Agency previously saw skirmishes on the Deobandi-Barelvi¹³ lines. Prominent groups included *Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)* led by Mangal Bagh Afridi, *Amr-Bin-Marooof-Wa-Nahee-Anil-Munkir* led by Haji Naamdard and *Ansar-ul-Islam (AI)* led by Qazi Mehboob. With the passage of time LI and AI turned on each other and bloody feuds ensued. Another recently formed party Tauheed-ul-Islam (TI) also joined against LI. TTP also aligned forces against LI to gain control of the area for its own use. *Mangal Bagh* and his men had been throwing their weight around in the agency since the past few years, however their sphere of influence remained small and localized, something the local law enforcing agencies were normally able to contain.

Mangal Bagh rose to prominence through the use of FM radio transmissions and kidnapping of businessmen, Christians and Sikhs from Peshawar city, for ransom. He came into focus due to two main incidents; the first incident was the kidnapping of 6 women, while the second included kidnapping of 14 Christians from Peshawar. These incidents caught the attention of federal forces which responded swiftly. Fighting in Khyber Agency also led to large number IDPs, most of whom ended up in the Jallozai Camp. The operation culminated in the signing of a peace deal in which LI accepted the government's writ in the Bara area.

Operation Daraghlum^{14,15} & Bya Daraghlum¹⁶ – Khyber Agency (December 2008-September 2009)

Khyber Agency contained the strategic Khyber Pass and the Pak-Afghan route passed through it. It was also the main route of NATO supplies for the US-led forces in Afghanistan. Increased presence of miscreants in the area, who would often loot the convoys or lit them on fire forced the Pakistani government to launch another operation in the agency.

12 Aaj Tv, Sirat-e-Mustaqeem operations to continue: Political Agent, <https://aaj.tv/2008/07/sirat-e-mustaqeem-operation-to-continue-political-agent/>

13 Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future, Sohail Habib Tajik, PIPS, Janu-ary-March 2011, page 9-10.

14 Dawn, 6 December 2008, <https://www.dawn.com/news/432408>

15 Dawn, 31 December 2008, <https://www.dawn.com/news/436340>

16 Dawn, 6 September 2009, <https://www.dawn.com/news/857097/43-militants-killed-in-khyber-operation>

The period of 2008 & 2009 saw a series of operations in Khyber Agency, which successfully inflicted heavy casualties onto the militants. However, these operations also led to the exodus of a large number of IDPs and inflicted heavy collateral damage, thus causing resentment amongst the local populace. Khyber Agency would continue to see more violence and military operations later.

Operation Brekhna¹⁷ – Mohmand Agency (September 2009)

Operation Brekhna was triggered by a number of suicidal blasts and kidnappings. The operation was launched in late 2009, to flush out TTP militants from the Mohmand valley which bordered the Kunar Province of Afghanistan. The operation was undertaken in four phases; in the first phase the area was cleared of the militants, in the second phase displaced people were brought back to the agency, in the third phase peace committees were established, and in the final phase confidence building measures were undertaken. By the end of the year, 80% area had been cleared of enemy positions.

Operation Rah-e-Nijaat¹⁸ – SWA (October 2009)

Mid-2009 saw successes in Swat. Taliban were on the run. To accrue maximum advantage from the prevailing environment, it was decided that Operation Raah-e-Nijaat (Path to deliverance) needed to be launched in SWA.

Forces started to shape the battlefield in June 2009. SWA was subjected to a blockade, check posts were established on all routes leading into and out of SWA, and regular screening of passersby commenced. Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur were sidelined through peace deals. Leaflets were dropped as part of a psychological campaign, carrying messages from religious authorities denouncing the ongoing jihad. Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone strike on 7 August 2009. He was replaced by his cousin, *Hakimullah Mehsud*.

The blockade continued for approximately three months where after the military operations commenced in October 2009. PAF lead through airstrikes, and troops of 11 Corps and FC participated in the ground offensive. Offensive was launched from three directions i.e. Razmak, Jandola and Shakai.

¹⁷ The Express Tribune, 22 April 2011, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/154251/operation-brekhna-kayani-visits-mohmand-agency/>

¹⁸ The recent history of Pakistani Military Counterinsurgency operations in the NWFP & FATA, Counterterrorism. Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New American Foundation, Sameer Lalwani, April 2010, page 8.

Heavy fighting occurred at Kannigurum, thought of as the HQ of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Other places that witnessed serious battles included Kotkai, Ladha, Sararogha and Makeen. Operations ended in December 2009, and led to the displacement of 80,000 -100,000 people.



COAS General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani & Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamaar Suleman visiting SWA on 29 November 2009¹⁹

Operation Khwakh Ba De Shum²⁰ – Orakzai & Kurram Agency (2010)

Operation Khwakh ba de shum (You will come to know / like me) was launched initially in Orakzai Agency on 23 March 2010 and later spread over to Kurram Agency. As elsewhere, troops of 11 Corps FC and PAF participated in the operation. More emphasis was laid on *search* and *cordon* and *sting operations* than hard core *kinetic concentrated operations*. The operations were successfully concluded by January 2011.

Operation Koh-e-Sufaid– Kurram Agency (June - August 2011)

Kurram valley has seen more than its fair share of sectarian violence between the southern Sunni majority areas and northern

¹⁹ The Express Tribune, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/722391/timeline-major-offensives-launched-by-army-against-militants/>

²⁰ Pakistan Military Operations against Terrorism, 5 June 2018, <http://tacstrat.com/index.php/2018/06/05/pakistan-military-operations-against-terrorism/>

Shia minority areas. Troubles of the valley were exacerbated once TTP militants from adjoining areas seeking refuge from military operations started gathering here. Incoming militants were also anti-Shia and virtually held the Shia community hostage by taking over control of the valley's main road of Tal-Parachinar, which was the Shia community's link with the rest of the country. The Shia community now had no other option but to circle through areas of Afghanistan to go to other parts of Pakistan.

As per international media reports, the Haqqani network was trying to settle down in Kurram, away from the U.S. drone attacks that were becoming more and more effective by the day. In February 2011, Haqqani's allegedly brokered a Sunni-Shia peace treaty in the area to precipitate peace, enabling them to avoid limelight and carry on with their business of fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. However, the surge in anti-Shia activities was making their position untenable which led to differences between the Haqqani network and the TTP leadership. A significant development immediately before the commencement of military operations was the defection of Fazal Saeed, a local Taliban commander from TTP and formation of his own faction, Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP), denouncing operations against the state of Pakistan and diverting his fighters against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan Army launched Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (White mountains) in June 2011, aimed at regaining control of the Tal-Parachinar road. Ground offensive was preceded by PAF sorties. Approximately 4000 troops of 11 Corps and FC participated under the supervision of the Commander 11 Corps Lieutenant General Asif Yaseen Malik. Lashkars of the Musazai tribesmen (a Sunni tribe) also participated in the operation against TTP. Forces progressed from both northern and southern directions, and the operation was completed by mid-August 2011.

The operation led to the displacement of approximately 100,000²¹ Kurram residents, a figure far larger than the initially anticipated 8000 - 2,000²² people. Approximately 200 militants were killed by the end of the campaign.

21 Limited goals limited gains : Pakistan Army's Operation in Kurram, Reza Jan and Sam Worby, September 6 2011, <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/limited-goals-limited-gains-the-pakistan-armys-operation-in-kurram>

22 -do-

Operation Tri-Star²³ – SWA (2011)

Operation *Tri Star* was launched on 13 July 2011 in *Janata*



COAS General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani with troops at Mandan, Kurram Agency after the successful culmination of Operation Koh-e-Sufaid.

Valley of SWA, where the terrorists had occupied surrounding heights and had setup training camps.

A two pronged operation in the 28 kilometers area inflicted heavy casualties on the terrorists besides uncovering of a huge cache of arms and ammunition.

Operation Khyber 1²⁴, 2²⁵, 3²⁶ & 4²⁷ – Khyber Agency (2014 - 17)

Khyber Agency has always enjoyed strategic significance due to the presence of the strategic Khyber Pass, which links Peshawar and Kabul, and has proved to be an important NATO supply route during the War On Terror. The area has thus been at the heart of all Taliban activities.

Operation Khyber 1, 2 & 3 were carried out in Khyber Agency against the Mangal Bagh led LeI, AI and TTP. Operations commenced in October 2014 from *Bara* plains and were later shifted to the *Tirah* valley. Few traces of Indian involvement were also found during these operations. Fighting also led to the movement of thousands

²³ The Express Tribune, 27 July 2011, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/218035/army-concludes-successful-south-waziristan-operation/>

²⁴ Dunya News, 17 October 2014, <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/241018-Pak-Army-launches-Operation-Khyber-1-several-mi>

²⁵ The Nation, 25 March 2015, <https://nation.com.pk/25-Mar-2015/operation-khyber-ii>

²⁶ Times of Islamabad, 22 August 2016, <https://timesofislamabad.com/22-Aug-2016/operation-khyber-iii-achievements-so-far>

²⁷ Dawn, 16 July 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1345690>

of IDPs. *Operation Khyber-III* was partly aimed at enhancing border management protocols and denying free movement of militants across the Pak-Afghan border. Most of the fighting occurred in the Rajgal valley, where the militants had positioned themselves in hideouts.

Khyber-IV was launched on 15 July 2017 to get rid of the last terrorists pockets in the Rajgal valley. The operation was successfully completed by 20 August 2017. Fifty-two terrorists were killed while 2 soldiers embraced *shahadat* in the operation, clearing an area of 253 square kilometers.


PAKISTAN'S CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF SINCE 9/11



General Pervez Musharraf
(1998-2007)



General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani
(2007-2013)



General Raheel Sharif
(2013-2016)



General Qamar Javed Bajwa
(2016 onwards)

PAKISTAN'S VICE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF SINCE 9/11



General Mohammad Yousuf Khan
(2001-2004)



General Ahsan Saleem Hayat
(2004-2007)



General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani
(2007)

CHAPTER

5

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AFFECTING PAKISTAN'S WAR ON TERROR

While armed forces engaged terrorists in the tribal areas and other parts of the country, there were many other events which happened outside the battle zones that had strong bearing on the overall dynamics of Pakistan's war on terror. Though people like Aafia Siddiqi, Raymond Davis or Malala Yousafzai were single individuals, however the ramifications of their cases were far reaching at both the domestic and international level. Similarly, incidents such as the attack on GHQ and Mehran Naval Base, Bannu & D.I. Khan jail breaks, the Salala incident, Bin Ladin's death in Abbottabad & Mumbai attacks also left strong prints on the war's course. Such incidents merit separate mention and understanding.

The A.Q. Khan Episode (2004)

Without exception, Pakistani nation reflected on Abdul Qadeer Khan as a national hero, prior to 2004. He had played an instrumental role in making Pakistan the seventh nuclear power in the world, and had thus induced nuclear stability in South Asia. The balance of power which had earlier tilted in India's favor since its nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, had been restored mostly due to Khan's efforts, for which he was highly revered by the nation.

All that however changed, once U.S. authorities intercepted a ship named *BBC China*¹ allegedly smuggling parts to Libya for its nuclear program, in January 2004. Allegations were made against Pakistan. The Musharraf-led government denied any involvement in the episode and all fingers were pointed towards Khan. Khan was arrested and a month later on 4 February 2004, his confession and apology were televised throughout the world wherein he also absolved the government of any prior knowledge. He was awarded

¹ The Wrath of Khan, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/304333/>

a presidential pardon by Musharraf on account of being a national hero.

The international community, IAEA officials in particular were less kind. They demanded that Khan be handed over to them for investigations about his network and its reach. The world also became seriously concerned about the safe custody of Pakistan's own nuclear arsenal, given Khan's inclinations. It was only fortunate that the prevailing geopolitical necessities (primarily Pakistan's lead role in War On Terror) stopped the U.S. from choking Pakistan to cough out Khan.

Nevertheless, unearthing of the A.Q. Khan network and the coming to fore of an underground nuclear black market, at a time when the world was deeply concerned and occupied with fighting terrorism, and keeping WMDs out of the reach of terrorists, greatly increased international fears over Pakistan's ability to secure its nuclear arsenal. Domestically, the unceremonious sacking of Khan from the KRL Laboratories gave room to deep misgivings wherein the people saw it as Musharraf's efforts to appease his U.S. mentors, in order to keep a firm grip on the presidency. It amounted to defaming and disgracing a national hero for personal gains. The whole episode worked in the favor of Terrorist organizations by driving a deeper wedge between the people and the government, and discrediting the country internationally.

The Aafia Siddiqi Case^{2,3,4}

Perhaps no other case regarding a single person has had as strong an impact on the war on terror in Pakistan, as the case of Aafia Siddiqi, rightly so as she is the only known female, accused of facilitating Al-Qaeda.

2 Justice for Aafia Coalition, Aafia Siddiqi campaign Pack, 2010.

3 The mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqi, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida>

4 Aafia Siddiqi: 'Lady Al Qaeda to Lady Islamic State', <https://www.dawn.com/news/1153276>

<i>U.S. Version of Aafia's Case</i>	<i>The U.S. version of the events states that Aafia had ties with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and was used as a courier by Al-Qaeda; she was arrested in 2008 in Afghanistan where she was in possession of certain drawings, explosive materials and plans for attacking U.S. targets; and while under arrest she shot a U.S. soldier (who survived). She has been sentenced to 86 years of imprisonment in 2010.</i>
<i>Aafia's family's Version</i>	<i>The version put forward by her relatives, especially her sister Fawzia Siddiqi is very different and ghastly. Their version states that Aafia had been abducted from Karachi in 2003, along with her 3 children and was handed over to the U.S. authorities, who flew her to Bagram Detention Facility; male occupants of Bagram later claimed that there was one female prisoner amongst them; the family claims that she was tortured and raped a number of times and two of her children were killed, while one mysteriously returned after almost 7 years.</i>
<i>Husband's Version</i>	<i>Her husband however tells a different story and claims that Aafia's views had become too radical and that was one of the causes of their divorce.</i>

The truth about Aafia Siddiqi case remains shrouded in mystery. At the time the case came to fore, there was utter disgust amongst the people who by then had had enough of U.S.-sponsored disappearances of Pakistani citizens. The allegations of rape of Aafia, and the killing of her children were extremely appalling. Even TTP and other militant groups openly expressed their sympathies with Aafia and offered to exchange prisoners in lieu of her. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani described her as a daughter of the country. Rallies and riots were common. Political forces also tried to settle old scores in the garb of Aafia's case. It was another all-time low in Pak-U.S. relations with Aafia taking the centre stage as an iconic victim of American arrogance and brutality. It reinforced the demonistic-cum-satanic perception of the U.S. government in the Pakistani mind. Much hatred was inbred against the Pakistani government also.

Extracts from the JFAC statement⁵ on sentencing of Aafia Siddiqi give an idea of the public sentiment that prevailed:

"While we are disappointed by Judge Berman's decision, we condemn in the strongest terms the stance of the Pakistani government towards this beloved daughter of the nation. While we must never look to the wolf for protection, we expect the shepherd to care for his flock. The Pakistani government has from the outset been complicit in Aafia's disappearance and detention, and has displayed nothing but contempt for its people and dignity through its cowardly stance in requesting her repatriation. They are a stain upon the honorable reputation of the country."



AAFIA SIDDIQI

The attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team (March 2009)

On 3 March 2009, terrorists attacked the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, while it was in route to Qaddafi Stadium Lahore, to play the third day's game of an ongoing test match between Sri Lanka and Pakistan. In the ensuing bloodbath, seven⁶ died while another twenty were injured. Lives of the Sri Lankan players were saved due to the courageous driving of the bus driver Mohammad Khalil who broke out of the cauldron despite being injured himself. He was later honored by the Sri Lankan team in Colombo. The attack was allegedly carried out by the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*.

⁵ Justice for Aafia Coalition, Statement on sentencing of Aafia Siddiqi, 30 November 2010.

⁶ 8 years ago today, Attack on the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1317979>

Another low point amidst a series of lows, attack on the Sri Lankan team further plummeted Pakistan's international standing and security outlook. Matters were slipping out of the hands of the state apparatus at a rapid pace. Though international cricket had already reduced greatly within Pakistan prior to the attack, however the attack on the Sri Lankan team finally sealed the fate of international cricket as well as other sport events in Pakistan. Pakistan was barred from co-hosting the ICC World Cup, due in 2011. Countries declined to send their players to Pakistan amidst heightened security fears. It was not until quite later, until the Pakistan Super league (PSL) final was played in Lahore in 2017, that some confidence could be restored.



ATTACK ON SRI LANKAN CRICKET TEAM

The attack on GHQ (October 2009)

On 10 October 2009, 10 armed terrorists stormed Pakistan Army's General Headquarters located in Rawalpindi. In the ensuing fight 23 people including a Brigadier and five terrorists were killed, while Pakistan's international image was greatly damaged. Planned in Miran Shah, the attack was aimed at negotiating the release of 115 arrested Taliban fighters by taking hostage army officers, preferably generals, as revealed later in a confessional statement⁷ by one of the attackers. The attack was meticulously planned wherein the terrorists attacked wearing military uniforms, and used military number plates and GHQ emblems on their Suzuki Van. Since weapons were

⁷ Attack on GHQ: Confessions of a terrorist mastermind, <https://www.dawn.com/news/660572>

prohibited inside the GHQ at that time, therefore the terrorists had a free hand once they reached inside and took 20-30 people hostage in one building. The area was retaken and the terrorists killed and / or arrested through a SSG (Special Services Group) operation by the next morning.

It was a new embarrassing low point for Pakistan and its Army, as the terrorists had been able to reach within tens of meters of the office of the Chief of Army Staff and other senior officers. Another growing concern was the emergence of Punjabi Taliban in the attack. In the trial that followed, two ex-soldiers named Aqeel alias Dr Usman, and Imran Siddiq were convicted amongst others, and were awarded the death penalty. The involvement of military personnel in the attack gave credence to the idea of rouge elements within the security establishment, which the international community was quick to point out.



ATTACK ON GHQ

The matter of the NATO supply routes

Afghanistan is a landlocked country and therefore logistics for NATO forces operating in Afghanistan have to be imported through its neighbors. While routes exist through Central Asian States, Russia and Iran, however the Pakistani route emerged as the best affordable and dependable option at the time. The

main routes through Pakistan are *Karachi-Chaman-Kandahar* and *Karachi-Peshawar-Kabul*. At the peak of the operations, approximately 5000⁸ containers plied on these routes each month.

Since both these routes passed through TTP-dominated territory, NATO forces in Afghanistan remained logistically vulnerable. TTP raised the momentum of attacks on NATO containers from 2008 onwards, in which complete convoys would either be looted or burned putting adverse toll on U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

At occasions, under circumstances that threatened Pakistan's sovereignty, GoP also used the NATO routes as leverage, e.g. the routes were unilaterally closed by Pakistan after the Salala incident and remained closed for about 2 years, till the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rendered a formal apology⁹ for that incident. At another occasion, NATO supplies were stopped in 2013 by the KPK government, to protest against drone attacks by the U.S.



ATTACK ON NATO SUPPLY ROUTES

Nineteen oil tankers set ablaze by gunmen on bikes, on 22 August 2011, at Kolpur village, 25 km south of Quetta.

By and large the NATO supply lines and the attacks on them continued to remain in the limelight for most part of the war and deeply effected Pak-U.S. relations. While the initial permission to establish NATO routes through Pakistan worked in the favour of

⁸ Militants in Pakistan attack NATO convoy, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7812723/Militants-in-Pakistan-attack-Nato-convoy.html>

⁹ U.S apologizes to Pakistan, says supply routes to reopen, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270204299704577503914049142208>

Pakistan, however attacks on the convoys in the later years adversely affected its international standing.

NATO RELATED INCIDENTS 2008-2017¹⁰

Serial	Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
1.	2008	8	6	54
2.	2009	25	12	20
3.	2010	99	37	64
4.	2011	108	53	71
5.	2012	20	5	11
6.	2013	31	19	16
7.	2014	18	11	18
8.	2015	0	0	0
9.	2016	0	0	0
10.	2017	0	0	0

The Blackwater Saga (2009)¹¹

Blackwater, (later renamed *Xe Services LLC*) is a private US military contractor company, that had earned notoriety in Iraq while operating side by side in military operations with other US security services. Reports of the presence of Blackwater in Pakistan surfaced in early 2009, which were initially rejected by both US and Pakistani authorities, however CIA later admitted to the presence of *Xe Services* in Pakistan on 14 December 2009. Two common excuses put forward stated that firstly, deployment of Backwater in foreign countries was a way of getting around the constraints placed by the Congress over the Department of Defense, and secondly, since US could not maintain military presence in Pakistan due to public sentiments, sending in its contractors who are 'civilians', technically speaking, absolved US and Pak authorities of any wrongdoings.

Public uproar ensued. Presence of US military contractors in Karachi and Islamabad was taken as grave violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, especially due to the clandestine nature of their operations. Initial denials by Pakistani authorities and their acceptance later on indicated connivance, and fueled negative public perceptions. Rumors and conspiracy theories erupted, defaming

¹⁰ South Asian Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/natoattack.htm>.

¹¹ The Secret US war in Pakistan, <https://www.thenation.com/article/secret-us-war-pakistan/>

the government and security establishment, raising concerns over the level of leverage the US government enjoyed over its Pakistani counterpart. Blackwater was accused of everything ranging from assisting Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in drone strikes and intelligence gathering, to assassinations within Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequent to public pressure, GoP was forced to distance itself from the US. The pushout of Blackwater and the likes worked in favor of Pakistan, however the consequent distancing in multiple domains adversely effecting Pak-US counter terrorism efforts.

The Raymond Davis Affair¹² (January 2011)

On 26 January 2011, an American diplomat Raymond Davis shot and killed two Pakistani young men whom he thought were following him and meant harm, while a related accident thereafter led to a third death. Compounding the situation was the suicide by the wife of one the victims, on account of her lack of faith in the judicial system. Raymond later surrendered and claimed diplomatic immunity. US initially juggled with its stances of whether Raymond was the employee of the US Embassy in Islamabad or the US consulate in Lahore, since the staff of both were entitled different types of immunities. A later revelation of Raymond being a CIA contractor further compounded complexities. The case spiraled into a bilateral crisis and became a test of US-Pak relations which fell to an all time low. Eventually the case was resolved through the application of Sharia law, clauses of which granted the pardon of a crime in case the victims' family accepted *Diyat* (compensation) and forgave the perpetrator. Raymond Davis was forgiven by the families of the victims on 16 March 2011, after a compensation of \$ 2.3 million.

The stakes for both Pakistan and the US became very high during the case. Both governments faced internal pressures and took rigid stances, however backdoor diplomacies found a breakthrough. Questions were raised about the presence of other CIA operatives like Raymond in Pakistan, about whom ISI had not been informed. It is commonly understood that it cost the then foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi his job for initially not granting diplomatic immunity to Raymond, and ousting the case to the courts. Public

¹² The Raymond Davis Affair, Rajshree Jetley, ISAS Brief No 191, National University of Singapore, 28 March 2011



RAYMOND DAVIS

passion was against granting immunities since the nature of crime was considered severe. A past example in which a Georgian diplomatic official¹³ was tried and sentenced in the US for drunk driving resulting in the death of a teenager, where his immunity was set aside also came to fore, and exposed the US's double face. Overall, the affair left a deep scar on the Pakistani society. It furthered the terrorist's narrative that the Pakistani government was acting as a US slave and did not feel any responsibility towards its citizens. Peter G Strasser¹⁴ has explained the affair as under:

"Arguably, like the Wagah ceremony, the Davis case had been choreographed from beginning to end, first by the Punjab government, then by the Punjab courts, and finally, reportedly by the ISI and military. And, in the end, the gates of the prison courthouse, like the gates at the border ceremony, clanged shut, with both sides walking away from the preceding turmoil. The official stance that the Pakistani government took was that the case was to be decided by the courts and, to that extent, President Zardari stood vindicated; it was the court that released Davis. As observed by The Economist, the irony that Davis' freedom may have been bought using Islamic law was not lost on the radical mullahs and their supporters. Dispirited, they did not join the massive, week-long protests held on the streets of Pakistan. As several commentators wryly stated at the time, "In a Lahore courtroom, the laws of God trumped the laws of man."

13 The Raymond Davis Affair : A case with Global Ramifications, Sajjad Ashraf, RSIS Commentaries No 33 / 2011, dated 3 March 2011.

14 The Evolving Pakistani Criminal Justice System: A Study of the Raymond Davis Matter, Peter G Strasser, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2014.

Operation Neptune Spear - The Killing of Osama Bin Laden¹⁵ **(May 2011)**

While Pakistan had not yet fully recovered from the Raymond Davis affair, it found itself in the middle of the mother of all controversies. On 2 May 2011, US forces in a clandestine operation crossed into Pakistan, raided Osama's hideout in Abbottabad, killed him, flew his body out and threw it into the Indian Ocean. Osama was hiding within 500 meters of the Pakistan Military Academy, a fact which kept hounding Pakistan Army and the government for times to come. All of this happened on Pakistani territory except that Pakistani authorities were not informed. It was a complete violation of international law and Pakistan's sovereignty. The US and western media pointed towards the competence of Pakistani authorities, even at times insinuating their complicity in hiding the Al-Qaeda supremo.

On the ground, US was facilitated in the operation by Dr Shakeel Afridi. Shakeel Afridi ran a fake Hepatitis B campaign in the housing colony where Osama was thought to be hiding. It has been said that Shakeel himself was not aware of the target of the operation when he was contacted by CIA. However there is no denying that his role was fundamental to the case. Afridi was later caught at Torkham border while trying to flee the country. The anger against Afridi originated from the fact that despite being a Pakistani national, he chose to provide information to foreign (US) authorities rather than Pakistani authorities, which eventually led to a US operation on Pakistani soil that greatly undermined Pakistan's sovereignty. Afridi was tried for treason, links with Mangal Bagh and the death of a patient eight years earlier and was given 33 years imprisonment.

Lost in the debate is often ISI's role, wherein it was actually ISI that shared the first thread of information that attracted US attention to the presence of a high value target in Abbottabad. US intelligence operators were quick in taking advantage of the information. Despite extending all out support throughout the war on terror and hitherto fore, ISI was dealt a bad hand in the entire episode. On being asked why Pakistani authorities were kept in the dark despite intelligence sharing mechanism and procedures in place, US officials indicated

¹⁵ Press briefing by senior administration official on the killing of Osama Bin Ladin, The White House, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/press-briefing-senior-adminis-tration-officials-killing-osama-bin-laden>

towards their lack of trust on their Pakistani counterparts as the main reason for not sharing Osama's information.

By and large, the presence of Osama within a settled city of Pakistan, within meters of military installations, and US arrogance of not informing Pakistani authorities and executing an operation on its soil left a very bad taste between the two countries, and forced the establishment and the nation to reconsider their priorities.

Attack on PNS Mehran Base¹⁷ (May 2011)

On 22 May 2011, 15 terrorists attacked Mehran Naval Base in Karachi, killing 10, wounding 15, and destroying two P-3C Orion aircrafts¹⁸.



THE SITUATION ROOM

Snapped by the official White House photographer, Pete Souza on 1 May 2011, this picture of the situation room captures the final moments when US forces attacked Osama Bin Laden's safe haven in Abbottabad, Pakistan and successfully killed the Al Qaeda leader.

TTP claimed the responsibility and its spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan explained it as:

"It was the revenge of the martyrdom of Osama Bin Laden. It was the proof that we are still united and powerful¹⁹".

¹⁶ TIME, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/pete-souza-situation-room>

¹⁷ Dawn, 22 May 2011, <https://www.dawn.com/news/630878>

¹⁸ Pakistan retakes Naval Base after militant attack, <https://www.dawn.com/news/631031>

¹⁹ Pakistani militants hit Karachi Naval Base in Bin Laden revenge attack, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/23/militants-attack-pakistani-naval-base-karachi>

Navy and other LEAs came under strong criticism after the episode, while reports circulated of insiders' involvement.^{20, 21} Questions were also raised on the safety and security of Pakistan nuclear arsenal. The attack had been preceded by smaller attacks on the buses transporting of Naval employees.

In 2014, PN successfully repulsed another militant attack on its dockyard, killing 2 militants while losing one of its own.

Story of the Salala Incident^{22, 23} (November 2011)

On 26 November 2011, two Pakistani military outposts along the Pak-Afghan border came under attack from NATO helicopters causing the death of 24 soldiers, injuring 13 others. The US inquiry report released in December that year placed part of the blame on the Pakistani side stating that they had opened fire and that the helicopters had only responded. The report was completely rejected by GHQ which issued a 24-pager response to the inquiry. GHQ stated that the fault lied with the US-NATO authorities for not informing the Pakistani side regarding operations so close to the Pak-Afghan border.

In the past, following four such incidents had taken place²⁴ :

- On 10 June, 2008, at Goraprai Post located in Mohmand Agency, an unprovoked US/ISAF aerial strike martyred 11 Pakistani soldiers and injured seven others.
- On 30 September, 2010, at Kharlachi Post in Kurram Agency, an unprovoked US aerial strike killed three soldiers and injured three others.
- On 17 June, 2011, there was an incident at Ziarat Post in the same Mohmand Agency close to the area of 26 November attack.
- On 19 July, 2011 an unprovoked US/ISAF mortar and artillery fire in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency martyred four Pakistani soldiers.

20 Dawn, 29 June 2011, <https://www.dawn.com/news/640291>

21 Pakistan Today, 22 May 2012, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/05/22/three-officers-punished-over-mehran-base-attack/>

22 Paks perspective on Investigation Report by Brig Stephen Clark into 26 Nov 11 US led IASf -NATO attk on Pak Volcano & Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency

23 US Mass Media and Image of Pakistan: An Analysis of Newsweek and the Economist after Salala Incident, M.Ashraf Khan, Benish Zaheen, Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities: Volume 22, Number 2, Autumn 2014

24 Abbottabad and Salala Attacks 2011, Editor Dr Noor-ul-Haq, IPRI Publication, February 2012.

Pakistani *Volcano* and *Boulder* Posts had been established since September 2011, and were located 1.2 kilometers inside own territory. The troops carried out speculative fire which is a normal procedure. US troops should not have been operating so close to the border without prior intimation, as were the laid down procedures. The helicopters pounded the posts for 2 hours despite communication at various levels by Pakistani authorities.

NATO supply routes passing through Pakistan were closed down due to the incident. They were finally reopened when the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton formally apologized²⁵ for the incident.

Shamsi Air Base^{26, 27} (SW of Quetta and NE of Gwadar) which had been earlier leased to UAE for game hunting had been further leased to the US forces immediately after 9/11. USAF clandestinely operated its drone missions from this base. After the Salala incident Pakistani Government asked the US to vacate the base, which it did in December 2011²⁸.

The Jail Breaks of Bannu^{29, 30} & Dera Ismail Khan³¹ (2012, 2013)

It is one thing to catch a militant, put him behind bars and then fight new ones, it is altogether another thing if you have to fight the same militant again and again because he manages to break out of prison each time. The year 2012 and 2013 saw two massive jail breaks, which plummeted national morale to a new low.

The first attack³² occurred on 14 April 2012, in which about 200 Taliban including suicidal bombers attacked the Central Jail in Bannu and managed to free 384 inmates. At the time, the prison was housing more than the normal strength of inmates since Kohat and Lakki Marwat prisons were being converted into rehabilitation centers. Twenty of the inmates were already facing death sentences.

25 US apologizes to Pakistan, says supply routes to reopen, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304299704577503914049142208>

26 Dawn, 12 December 2011, <https://www.dawn.com/news/680009>

27 The Express Tribune, 7 July 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/202213/the-curious-case-of-the-shamsi-airbase/>

28 The New York Times, 11 December 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/world/asia/cia-leaves-pakistan-base-used-for-drone-strikes.html>

29 Dawn, 22 April 2012, <https://www.dawn.com/news/712533>

30 The New York Times, 15 April 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/world/asia/pakistani-taliban-as-sault-prison-freeing-almost-400.html>

31 The Telegraph, 30 July 2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10210231/More-than-240-prisoners-escape-in-Pakistan-jailbreak.html>

32 Prison break: Taliban attack Bannu Jail, nearly 400 inmates escape, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/365064/prison-break-militants-attack-bannu-jail-over-900-inmates-freed/>

In the second attack, on 29 July 2013 about 100 Taliban some wearing police uniforms attacked the Central Jail in Dera Ismail Khan and managed to free 175³³ -248³⁴ inmates, including 35 high profile militants. Nine people including 4 policemen were killed.

The Horrifying Attack on a Daughter of the Nation - Malala³⁵ (October 2012)

In history, 9 October 2012 went down as the day a daughter of Pakistan was attacked by militants as the day a daughter of Pakistan was attacked by militants. Malala Yousufzai was a young girl in Mingora, Swat who first came to prominence when she started writing a blog for BBC Urdu under the pen name *Gul Makai*, regarding life in the militancy-struck Swat valley. Fazlullah-led militants had been continuously blowing up girls schools and had placed a ban on girls' education in Swat. Malala became a young activist who pleaded the case of education for girls at various forums including national television. In 2011, she was nominated for *International Children's Peace Prize*. In December 2011, she was awarded the *National Peace Prize for Youth* by the Prime Minister.

On 9 October 2012, at the age of 15, Malala was shot in the head and face by a militant, who halted the bus in which she was coming back from school. Having been evacuated and treated in a number of hospitals, Malala was flown to the UK where she recovered and was discharged from the hospital on 3 January 2013. The complete nation and the international community were grief-stricken for the child and were deeply appalled by the barbaric nature of the attack. Sympathy and anger flooded the international media, while public support for military operations strengthened.

After recovering, Malala become a full time activist and celebrity. She has met with Queen Elizabeth, Barack Obama, has spoken at the UN, Harvard University, Oxford Union, a petition was submitted to the UN by the name of "I am Malala" demanding education for all children , boys and girls alike by 2015, Madonna

33 Pakistani Taliban free over 175 inmates in D.I. Khan jailbreak, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1032777>

34 Pakistan jailbreak: Taliban free 248 in Dera Ismail Khan, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23493323>

35 Malala's Story, Malala Fund, <https://www.malala.org/>

made a Malala tattoo on her back and dedicated a song for her during a concert, Angelina Jolie gave \$200,000 to the Malala Fund, Laura Bush wrote an article about her in the Washington Post, on her 16th birthday UN named the day as Malala Day, Ban Ki Moon described her as “our hero”, received an honorary doctorate degree from a university in Nova Scotia, and in October 2014 she received the Nobel Peace Prize as the second Pakistani to be awarded such a prestigious award. Malala has co-authored her memoirs, “I am Malala”.

She did receive some negative publicity also, in that some people considered her sudden rise as western conspiracy against Islam. Her ideas were considered to be polluted by western influence and at times she was also blamed as a CIA spy.



MALALA IS AWARDED THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE 2014

Malala Yousufzai and Kailash Satyarthi are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in December 2014 at Oslo.

Mayhem in Mumbai (2008)

Mumbai attacks comprised of a series of attacks which included shootings and bombings carried out in Mumbai India, between 26-29 November 2008, allegedly by 10 members of LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba), resulting in the death of 164, injuring another 308. The locations attacked included *Leopold Café*, *Chhatrapati Shivaji Railway Station*, *Oberoi Trident*, *Cama Hospital* and *Metro Cinema*, however

most of the event unfolded in and around the *Taj Mahal Palace Hotel*. Indian forces launched '*Operation Black Tornado*' which culminated in the death of all attackers less one; Ajmal Qassab, who was caught and all alleged disclosures stem from him. Fingers quickly pointed towards Pakistan. Indian media later alleged that certain retired officers of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency had lent support to the terrorists.

The attacks shook the complete Indian nation to the core, who demanded retribution from their government. Indian forces were quickly amassed along the Indo-Pak border, to which Pakistan responded in kind. Forces of both the countries spent 6–8 months



MUMBAI ATTACKS

Taj Mahal Hotel

deployed "eyeball to eyeball", additionally straining Pakistan's already overstretched LEAs and armed forces. It also meant that Pakistan had to dilute its deployment on Pak-Afghan border to face the threat on the Indo-Pak border, an action which the US did not favor, since they needed Pakistani forces along Pak-Afghan border once ISAF fought Afghan Taliban forces.

Mumbai attacks had adverse effects for Pakistan, despite its noninvolvement. Though some allegations of stage management by India also came to light, by and large Pakistan's international position was effected. US had pointed out at 'rogue elements' in ISI in the past. Mumbai attacks furthered such apprehensions also. Demands of purging ISI were heard. While Pakistan attempted to conduct a free and fair trial of those allegedly involved, the delay in the outcome is largely attributed to India, due to its feet-dragging on provision of on-site evidence.



AJMAL KASAAB

The sole survivor out of the Mumbai attackers.

10 COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2012³⁶

Serial	Countries	Attacks	Killed	Wounded	Average Number Killed per Attack	Average Number Wounded per Attack
1.	Pakistan	1404	1848	3643	1.32	2.59
2.	Iraq	1271	2436	6641	1.92	5.23
3.	Afghanistan	1023	2632	3715	2.57	3.63
4.	India	557	231	559	0.41	1.00
5.	Nigeria	546	1386	1019	2.54	1.87
6.	Thailand	222	174	897	0.78	4.04
7.	Yemen	203	365	427	1.80	2.10
8.	Somalia	185	323	397	1.75	2.15
9.	Philippines	141	109	270	0.77	1.91
10.	Syria	133	657	1787	4.94	13.44

36 Annex of Statistical Information, Country Report on Terrorism 2012, START, May 2013, page 4

CHAPTER

6

THE NATION GETS BEHIND THE WAR ON TERROR

While public opinion in Pakistan remained split during the first decade of the 21st century, the ensuing mayhem caused by terrorism forced public opinion to change. Few people had since long been calling the war on terror as '*our own war*' instead of a '*US war*', but the public was slow in acknowledging it. By the turn of the decade, the nation had witnessed too much of bloodshed throughout its length and breadth. Civil society voiced its concerns more openly. Politico-religious groups who had been also started to distance themselves from extremist elements. A more forceful and result-oriented approach was being demanded against terrorists.

National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

The new post 9/11 world saw coming up of institutions specifically geared for counter-terrorism, be it the US National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or other institutions globally. Pakistan was long in need of such an institution at the national level where state organs and efforts could be synergized. In this regard, the NACTA Act¹ was passed by the National Assembly and approved by the President in March 2013.

Prime Minister of Pakistan is the Chairman of NACTA while its members include Provincial Chief Ministers, Interior Minister, few other ministers, Heads of Intelligence organizations, and Inspector General's of Police. While NACTA was initially setup in 2009, it got embroiled in issues of mandate, resource constraints, legal status and administrative control and thus remained inactive.

¹ Act number XIX of 2013, No F.9, (12) / 2013-Legis, The Gazette of Pakistan, Extra, 26 March 2013.

It was assigned following functions² in 2013:

- To receive and collate data, information or intelligence, and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism.
- To coordinate and prepare comprehensive national counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies, and review them on periodic basis.
- To develop action plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal Government about implementation of these plans on periodic basis.
- To carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents.
- To carry out liaison with International entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism.
- To review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal Government.
- To appoint committees of experts from Government and non-Government organizations for deliberations in areas related to the mandate and functions of the Authority.

As is evident from the assigned functions, NACTA is not mandated to fight terrorism as is often incorrectly expected from it. Its nature of job relates more to strategizing, coordination, legal and policy making aspects of counter terrorism. Nevertheless the organization has not had much to show for its credit as yet.

Formulation of the Country's First National Internal Security Policy (NISP)³ 2014

NISP was formally approved by the federal cabinet on 25 February 2014. Prior to that date, there was absence of an overarching national policy to fight terrorism and maintain internal security. Terrorism-related matters were often dealt on case to case basis. Many departments were left wondering about their role

² <http://www.nacta.gov.pk/About.htm>

³ National Internal Security Policy 2014 – 2018, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan.

in the war on terror, which resulted in its total delegation to the armed forces alone. Armed forces can fight but fighting alone is not enough. A national threat merits a national response, which merits a national policy defining the contours of security, and laying down the expectations from national institutions.

The NISP carries the following vision⁴ for Pakistan's internal security future:

Create a safe environment where life, property, civil liberties and socioeconomic rights of the citizens are protected and the people of Pakistan are able to live and prosper in harmony, freedom, respect and dignity as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan."

CONTOURS OF NISP⁵

1.	<i>The contours of response mechanism of NISP hinge upon the major activities under taken by various stakeholders implementing the Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP) and Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP).</i>
2.	<i>Construct a national narrative on extremism, terrorism, sectarianism and militancy to dispel the wrong perceptions created by the terrorists on ideological basis by engaging media, civil society organizations, overseas Pakistanis and international community to elicit support and cooperation.</i>
3.	<i>Design and implement national de-radicalization program for the people vulnerable to extremism that can be rehabilitated and reintegrated in the society.</i>
4.	<i>Integrate the mosques and the madaris in the national and provincial educational establishment by mapping and thereafter mainstreaming the existing and new madaris and private sector educational institutions.</i>
5.	<i>Develop social and physical infrastructure in terrorism-affected regions through sustained and inclusive efforts by all state institutions at federal and provincial levels.</i>
6.	<i>Rehabilitate all victims of terrorism especially vulnerable groups like women, children, elderly, minorities and people with special needs.</i>
7.	<i>Improve worsening law and order situation by eliminating trends of targeted assassinations, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and other serious and organized crime.</i>
8.	<i>Ensure protection of key installations and places of national importance.</i>
9.	<i>Enforce a comprehensive arms control regime across the country.</i>
10.	<i>Prevent misuse of social, electronic and print media; mobile phone SIMs and electronic devices, and prevent cyber crimes for any purpose threatening internal security.</i>
11.	<i>Integrate national database and registration plan to identify people residing in Pakistan and their assets.</i>

⁴ National Internal Security Policy 2014 – 2018, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, page 5

⁵ National Internal Security Policy 2014 – 2018, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, page 9-12

12.	<i>Design and implement plans to regulate lawful movement of Afghan refugees within the country.</i>
13.	<i>Enforce a robust border control regime to interdict illegal cross border movement of persons, goods, drugs and precursors, weapons or any other material threatening internal security.</i>
14.	<i>Capacity building and modernization of all pillars of Criminal Justice System including judiciary, police, prosecution and high security prisons in all geographic entities of Pakistan.</i>
15.	<i>Establishment of Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under NACTA where thirty three civilian and military intelligence and operational agencies are represented having clear articulation of command and control by integrating all grids of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence, civil and military, under one roof.</i>
16.	<i>Capacity building of DIS for collection, analysis and dissemination through integrated qualitative intelligence gathering efforts having direct bearing on Internal Security to develop operational capability of conducting 'Intelligence Based Operations' to contain, pre-empt and eliminate terrorism and other threats to public safety.</i>
17.	<i>Establishment of a modern, well-equipped Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) comprising of Counter Terrorism Departments and Police with experts from other security institutions with nationwide reach and capability to interface and operate in close coordination with Police, CAFs (Civil Armed Forces and Pakistan Armed Forces).</i>
18.	<i>Reorganization and activation of Counter Terrorism Departments (CTD) within Police organizations of all the Provinces, Islamabad Capital Territory, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, preferably with uniform structure and unified command at provincial, regional and field level.</i>
19.	<i>All CTDs to comprise of intelligence, operations, investigations, Provincial Rapid Response Forces (RRF) and other technical sections enabling themselves to tackle the entire spectrum of internal security threats including terrorism and subversive activities.</i>
20.	<i>Modernization of RRFs under CTDs with matching capabilities as that of Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) for ensuring uniformity.</i>
21.	<i>Establishment of a dedicated CAF headquarter under MoI (Ministry Of Interior) for integrated border management and modernization and coordination of CAFs, i.e. Pakistan Rangers (Punjab and Sindh), Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan), Frontier Constabulary, Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts, Pakistan Coast Guards, and Anti-Narcotics Force.</i>
22.	<i>Modernization of law enforcement components of Pakistan Customs besides Levies in FATA and Baluchistan and other LEAs.</i>
23.	<i>Making concerted diplomatic efforts for international cooperation to break transnational affiliations of terrorists through prevention of money laundering, organized crime and transnational movement of substances used in biological and chemical terrorism</i>

Operation Zarb-e-Azb⁶ – NWA & Other Areas (June 2014 – December 2016)

The Government of Pakistan gave a fair chance to ceasefires, peace deals and negotiations. A round of formal negotiations

6 Zarb-e-Azb for Peace, IPRI, Mohammad Munir, July 2, 2014.

between The Government of Pakistan and TTP began in March 2014 when a one month's truce was announced by both sides. The first round of talks was held on 26 March 2014⁷ in Islamabad. GoP was represented by *Irfan Siddiqi* (Prime Minister's Adviser on National Affairs), *Rahimullah Yousufzai* (Journalist and expert), *Rustum Shah Mohmand* (former ambassador and expert), and *Amir Shah* (former ISI official). The TTP nominated, *Imran Khan* (Chairman PTI), *Maulana Sami-ul-Haq* (cleric and politician), *Maulana Abdul Aziz* (ex-cleric of Lal Masjid), *Professor Ibrahim* (Jamaat-e-Islami) and *Mufti Kifayatullah* (Jameeat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl-ur-Rehman) to represent them. Imran Khan and Fazl-ur-Rehman however later side stepped from the responsibility. TTP had two basic demands i.e. creation of a demilitarized zone in SWA and release of its non-combatants.

Though the talks began in a positive manner, however TTP continued their terrorist activities during the talks on one pretext or another. Peace talks finally collapsed when on 8 June 2014, TTP and IMU gunmen dressed as security guards, attacked the Jinnah International Airport Karachi, killing 36, injuring 18 others. Three passenger aircrafts were also damaged during the attack. Another noticeable development⁸ in this timeframe included infighting between the *Sheheryar Mehsud-led* and *Khalid Said Sajna-led* TTP factions resulting in the death of more than a 100 militants.

Possibly the most important development in this timeframe was the linkage established between terrorist acts in China's Uighur province with the militants in Mir Ali, NWA. *Turkestan Islamic Party's* leader *Abdullah Mansur*⁹ had issued warnings to the Chinese government from his den in Mir Ali, after which his party launched a number of terrorist activities in China. This placed strain on time-tested Pak-China friendship. Pakistan sprang into action.

On 15 June 2014, the army launched Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* (Strike of the Prophets' sword), with complete support of the government and the public. The operation was aimed at eliminating the scourge of terrorism in totality, without differentiating between

7 Struggling IDPs of North Waziristan in the wake of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Nida Hameed, NDU Journal 2015, page 97

8 Zarb-e-Azb – An Evaluation of Pakistan Army's Anti Taliban Operation in North Waziristan, Vivikananda Inter-national Foundation, 2014, page 35-361

9 Zarb-e-Azb – An Evaluation of Pakistan Army's Anti Taliban Operation in North Waziristan, Vivikananda Inter-national Foundation, 2014, page 36-37.

Good Taliban or Bad Taliban. It was launched in NWA, which had become a hub of all terrorist activities. The operation was carefully planned and prepared for. All entry and exits points into the valleys were monitored. FATA Disaster Management Authority established IDP camps well in advance. Surrender points for militants voluntarily laying down their arms were prepared. Afghan Government was requested to seal the exit routes in Paktia, Khost and Paktika.



ZARB-E-AZAB

The operation kicked off successfully. Miran Shah and Mir Ali were mostly cleared a month into the operation. Dattakhel and Shawal witnessed intense fighting and were eventually cleared. All organizations were targeted without discrimination. Effect of the all-inclusive nature of the operation have been described by Mohammad Munir¹⁰ as under:

“The positive aspects of this strategy include: first, Pakistan’s most immediate goal is naturally to ensure the safety of their own citizens by targeting terrorist groups which were carrying out domestic attacks; second, because of all inclusive approach, it will increase the credibility of the operation in the international community; third, it will facilitate in meeting the requirements for releasing \$300 million of the \$900 million Coalition Support Fund under the Carl Levin National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015; fourth, this strategy will also dispel the impression that Pakistan is reluctant to take any action against some groups such as Haqqani Network; fifth, Chinese concerns regarding presence of members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in North Waziristan have also been taken care

¹⁰ Zarb-e-Azb for Peace, IPRI, Mohammad Munir, July 2, 2014.

of in the operation as many ETIM terrorists and their affiliates had also been killed in the strikes; sixth as now the militants of Haqqani Network have moved to Afghanistan and high command of TTP had already taken refuge there, Pakistan is now in a position to ask Afghanistan and USA to take necessary action on their side of the border.

The negative aspects of the all inclusive approach include: first, the strategy of targeting all terrorist groups might have a severe blowback and may end up uniting the militant groups; second, Pakistan may lose the leverage on Haqqani Network that it could have used for reconciliation in Afghanistan; third, lack of action by Afghan and NATO forces against the militant groups who have sneaked into Afghanistan would remain a constant threat to Pakistan; fourth, the issue of terrorism is no more a global threat due to decrease in Al-Qaeda's global reach and its focus has been shifted to regions, in view of this transformation there are very less chances that the international community would come forward to help Pakistan specially to overcome the economic losses and even for rehabilitation and settlement of IDPs from North Waziristan."

On completion of 2 years of Zarb-e-Azab, the army released details¹¹ of the achievements which included the decrease of terrorism within the country by 40-50 %, whereas international terrorism had increased with the same ratio within the same period, conduct of 19,000 Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs), clearance of 4000 square kilometers area from the terrorists in NWA, seizure of 243 tons of explosives, enough to make one Improvised Explosive Device (IED) per day for the next 17 years, shut down of 7500 bomb factories, wiping out of 992 sanctuaries, killing of 3500 terrorists, de-weaponization campaign in NWA which had registered 3000 tribesmen, 567 welfare projects undertaken by the military and provision of intimate support during the rehabilitation of 61% of the IDPs.

The success of ZeA finds few parallels in modern history. The operational progress has been applauded both domestically and internationally. Arguably, it is likely to land into counter insurgency textbooks internationally. It has proven the resolve of the people

¹¹ <http://nation.com.pk/national/06-Sep-2016/operation-zarb-e-azab-two-years-of-success>

and the armed forces to rid their home of extremists. It has shown light at the end of a very dark tunnel.

Nail in the Coffin – The APS, Peshawar Attack (December 2014)

The fateful day of 16 December 2014 will go down as one of the darkest days in Pakistan's history, when seven TTP foreign militants attacked an Army Public School in Peshawar killing 142¹², including 132 children. The sheer barbarianism of the operation laid seed to deep-rooted hatred against the Taliban and galvanized public support in favor of ZeA.

TTP's stated reason for the attack was their retaliation to ZeA, in which they alleged that the army was targeting their families and they wanted the army to feel the pain. Targeted killing of children in schools can however never be justified. Shock and grief gripped the nation which resulted in drawing of lines, hardening of stances and popular demand for revenge. With the nation rallied up behind the government and the army, it was time to get rid of TTP once and for all.



APS ATTACK

¹² Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A successful Initiative to Curtail Terrorism, Umbreen Javaid, Research Journal of South Asian Studies, July – December 2015.

The National Action Plan (NAP)¹³ & the 21st Constitutional Amendment

The atrocity of the Peshawar attack and the resultant anger within the nation prompted the government into action. All Parties Conference was convened with speed and urgency, and a National Action Plan was chartered. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the launching of the NAP via a televised address on 24 December 2014.

It comprised of 20 main points, which included actions such as the revival of the death penalty, forming of Special Military Courts for 2 years, and the revamping of the criminal justice system, amongst others. In essence it was a complete crackdown on militancy in all its forms and manifestations, be it religious, sectarian, political or criminal in nature. All states' organs were tasked to work in synergy towards attainment of the goal of a peaceful and stable Pakistan.

NAP transcended into the 21st constitutional amendment and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill 2015, which were passed unopposed (few parties abstained from voting), by both the National Assembly and the Senate on 6 January, 2015. The amendment contained a 2 years sunset clause, on completion of which, it was to be automatically dissolved.



NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Presiding a NAP Meeting

¹³ Reference : <http://nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm>

Implementation of NAP remained a source of concern for all stakeholders. While visible progress was made in few fields such as the constitution of Special Courts, progress in other areas remained slow e.g. revamping of the criminal justice system. Provincial Apex Committees were formed, where both civil and military leadership got together to review the internal situation and plan for the future.

20 POINTS OF NATIONAL ACTION PLAN (NAP)¹⁴

1.	<i>Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.</i>
2.	<i>Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.</i>
3.	<i>Militant outfits and armed gangs not to be allowed to operate in the country.</i>
4.	<i>NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution to be strengthened.</i>
5.	<i>Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.</i>
6.	<i>Choking financing for terrorists and terrorist organizations.</i>
7.	<i>Ensuring against reemergence of proscribed organizations.</i>
8.	<i>Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.</i>
9.	<i>Taking effective steps against religious persecution.</i>
10.	<i>Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.</i>
11.	<i>Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.</i>
12.	<i>Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.</i>
13.	<i>Communication network of terrorists to be dismantled completely.</i>
14.	<i>Measures against use of internet and social media for terrorism.</i>
15.	<i>Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab.</i>
16.	<i>Ongoing operation in Karachi to be taken to its logical end.</i>
17.	<i>Baluchistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.</i>
18.	<i>Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.</i>
19.	<i>Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.</i>
20.	<i>Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.</i>

Operation Radd-ul-Fassad (December 2016 onwards)

General Raheel Shareef retired in November 2016 after an illustrious career, which would be envied by many. His successor, General Bajwa was quick to fill in the boots. Proving himself worthy

¹⁴ NACTA, <http://nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm>

of the ranks and responsibilities he had to shoulder, Pakistan Army launched Operation Radd-ul-Fassad (Riddance of all Menaces) under their new Chief's leadership.



OPERATION RADD-UL-FASSAD

Terrorists resumed their activities in the beginning of 2017, with a number of back to back attacks, the most damaging ones being a suicidal attack in Lahore on 13 February 2017, killing 12 and injuring 80, and another suicidal attack on 16 February 2017 at the Shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sind killing 88, injuring 300. Mixed claims were laid to the attack by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP and ISIS.

The Army responded with full force, killing more than 100 militants within days of the crackdown. Links of the terror attacks were traced back to Afghanistan and a list of 76 wanted terrorists was handed over to the government of Afghanistan, while the Pak-

Afghan border was also sealed temporarily. The border crossings at Torkham and Chaman have traditionally witnessed thousands of people and vehicles cross over each day. As the humanitarian crisis rose on both sides of the border, the border crossing was temporarily opened for 48 hours on 7-8 March 2017, to facilitate the 50,000 or so people stranded on both sides. The border was fully reopened after a month on the orders of the Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif. The Afghan government also handed over a list of 86 terrorists and 32 training camps it alleged were operating from within Pakistan, and Afghanistan wanted them destroyed. Radd-ul-Fassad is unique in one manner that the scope of military operations has been expanded to all areas including Punjab specially southern Punjab, which was earlier considered off-limits, mostly due to political pressures.

ISPR PRESS RELEASE NUMBER 87 / 2017¹⁵

PRESS RELEASE REGARDING COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION

RADD-UL-FASSAD

"Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' (رَدُّ الْفَسَاد) across the country. Operation aims at indiscriminately eliminating residual / latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders. Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan Navy, Civil Armed Forces (CAF) and other security / Law Enforcing Agencies (LEAs) will continue to actively participate / intimately support the efforts to eliminate the menace of terrorism from the country. The effort entails conduct of Broad Spectrum Security / Counter Terrorism (CT) operations by Rangers in Punjab, continuation of ongoing operations across the country and focus on more effective border security management. Country wide de-weaponisation and explosive control are additional cardinals of the effort. Pursuance of National Action Plan will be the hallmark of this operation."

15 ISPR, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=3775&cat=army

CHAPTER

7

PAKISTAN'S WAR ON TERROR A COMMENTARY

Arguably, Pakistan has faced the maximum brunt of the War on Terror and stood its grounds. Stronger countries have imploded under lesser pressure. For that, the resilience of the Pakistani nation merits commendation. They stood their turf once the world lost faith in them, when enemies conspired for their downfall and when their society faced seizure from within. It seems that the test is coming to an end, and the nation has been able to secure a decent score for itself. Today's Pakistan stands at the doorsteps of a brighter prosperous future. It needs to, and it has learnt from its past.

How did Pakistan get itself into so much of Trouble?

Being only 54 years old on the eve of 9/11, Pakistan may be considered a relatively young state by international standards. Over the years, the country had undergone 4 wars with a neighbor 4 times its size, had been broken down into two new countries, had seen insurgency in Baluchistan, and a number of coups and political crises. On its western border, it had been fighting a proxy war against the Russians in sync with the Americans and was home to more than 2 million Afghan refugees for more than 3 decades. It was also facing international sanctions due to its nuclear explosions of May 1998. It is fair to say that the country already had its hands full at the time of 9/11.

In terms of international relations, it is important to keep in mind that *'Friends may come and go but neighbors stay forever'*. Pakistan's neighbors include China, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 2400 km international border called the *'Durand Line'*, named after the British officer who had established it by securing an agreement with the Afghan government in 1883. This border enjoyed little significance

prior to 9/11, since a sizeable Pashtun diaspora lives astride it. Intermarriages and cross border movement is common and welcomed. What the governments of the countries view as *smuggling*, the people living across the border view as legitimate *trade*. Many Afghan leaders have resided in Pakistan at one time or another and therefore reflect favorably on it.

Pak-Afghan relations have seen their fair share of ups and downs. In all fairness, Afghanistan is responsible for most of the downs, if not all. Its actions like not accepting Pakistan's creation in 1947, opposing its inclusion into the UNO in 1948, not accepting Durand Line as the international border, laying claim to almost half of its territory and propagating secessionist themes by supporting the creation of *Pakhtunistan* are some of the factors that negatively impinge on Pak-Afghan relations. Despite these provocations Pakistan has always extended its hand in friendship, drawing motivation from the ethno-religious affinity that both the countries enjoy. It has housed over 3 million Afghan refugees for over 3 decades, a feat possibly unparalleled in world history. Despite this, Afghans have accused Pakistan of intentionally destabilizing Kabul and continuously meddling in its internal affairs. Nothing could be far from the truth. Pakistan is only guilty of protecting its national interests, while simultaneously seeking a friendlier regime in Kabul. While some commentators reflect on this view point as an over simplification of facts, it is by and large the truth.

When USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, an exodus of refugees fled to Pakistan, bringing with them drugs and guns, amongst other vices. Pakistan sided with the US-led western block against the Soviets. The war ended with the Russian withdrawal and eventual breakup. Support from the US dwindled before the Afghan society could stand back on its feet, due to which Afghanistan spiraled into a civil war, during which Mullah Omar led Taliban emerged as a power bloc. Since Taliban enjoyed ethnic affinity with Pakistan, and since most of the Taliban were the earlier Mujahideen that Pakistan had assisted, therefore Pakistan was quick in recognizing their government and extending full support.

The shocking events of 9/11 and the coming of Al Qaeda into the equation left both countries dumbfounded. While Pakistan was quick to choose sides, the Afghan Taliban had trouble accepting US allegations against Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, they had to pay a heavy price. Pakistan extended support to US troops to fight Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, including the NATO supply route. Providing ground and aerial routes and airbases to US forces, and conducting operations in support of OEF triggered resentment amongst both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani population, against the Pakistani government.

Also, as time progressed, US demands of '*do more*' kept deepening the quagmire for Pakistan. While it was principally aligned with the US-led coalition, it could ill-afford to up stick forces from its eastern border deployed against its arch enemy India, and redeploy them on the western border. It could also ill-afford to anger the Afghan Taliban or its own tribal populace living in FATA. This predicament caused the states' responses to be initially sluggish, confusing, and detrimental to its internal security situation, which was otherwise fast deteriorating.

Evolution of the Response to Terror

Whereas GoP had agreed to join the coalition against terrorism at the outset, the Pakistani people were not initially convinced about the legitimacy of the campaign. Protests, demonstrations, rallies and riots erupted nationwide. Religious parties completely opposed the use of force. Difference of opinion existed within military circles also, as a few found it difficult to reconcile with the changed environment, its new requirements and diktats. To be fair, none of these people were to be blamed. Before 9/11, most people were encouraged to reflect on the Afghan Jihad as a legitimate religious calling, and to reflect on Taliban as rightly guided people. It now seemed deceiving and even sinful to suddenly part ways with those Afghan brethren.

Initially, the people distanced themselves from the war on terror. Popularity of Musharraf and the Army was adversely affected. The Army took time to develop its response to this new form of warfare, within this time militants started targeting military personnel, especially officers. Faced with such circumstances,

officers and men were instructed not to leave the cantonment premises in uniform. Higher military leadership had also to put in extra efforts to keep their under command convinced of the legitimacy of their cause.

GoP was also half hearted in its attempts to fight initially, and would sign peace deals with Taliban at the drop of a hat. That approach however, did not work. Ample opportunities were given to the fighters to lay down their arms, and amnesty was announced for them more than once. They however, chose to continue fighting.

Sometime later, a debate spread in the country about the idea of *Good Taliban* and *Bad Taliban*, wherein the Taliban who fought the Coalition forces in Afghanistan were thought to be fighting for the sovereignty of their country, which was their legitimate right, and were therefore on the right. Pakistan did not need to fight those Taliban. They could either be encouraged to stop carrying out cross border attacks through negotiations and peace deals, or could be requested to vacate the area. Bad Taliban were those who declared war against the state of Pakistan and were thus to be fought and eliminated e.g. TTP, LI, TNSM etc. This line of thinking however had its flaws since both good and bad Taliban were inter-related, sympathized and supported each other, kept jumping across the fence and remained indistinguishable. Though in this context, international media has often blamed Pakistan for playing a double game, however the truth of the matter is that this concept was no more than an academic debate and never took deep roots on ground.

Two things played an important role in rallying up public support for the fight against terrorism. The first was a visible increase in the indiscriminate and brutal terror attacks. Attacks on mosques, destruction of public property such as schools and hospitals, targeted destruction of girl schools, killing of tribal leaders, attacks on PAF, PN and Army bases and Marriott Hotel etc resulted in the people's growing disenchantment with the Taliban, and a sincere demand for action against them. The other important reason was that people internationally witnessed the horrors of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and other countries. The total

collapse of those countries, the civil wars that ensued, and there abject miseries instilled concerns in the Pakistani people. Public support was slowly galvanized, although incidents of American heavy-handedness such as the Salala attacks, Raymond Davis affair, Drone Attacks and the Abbottabad attack etc often proved counter-productive and would create a rift between the GoP and its people. The APS attack proved to be the last nail in the coffin for the TTP, where after a deeply saddened and angered nation, put its full support behind Operation ZeA.

Institutionally speaking, Pakistan was not initially geared up to fight internally. Prior to 9/11, its armed forces were mostly trained and equipped to fight external aggression from India. FC and Rangers were meant to control smuggling and cross border movement, while Police was meant to address regular street crime. Once faced with terrorism, it took the state institutions some time to understand the requirements of the new way of fighting. They learnt through trials, errors and omissions, and re-orientated themselves for the new enemy. The state began synergizing efforts and finally evolved the NISP, NACTA and NAP to fight terrorism at the national level.

Divisions 7 & 9, 11 Corps were selected because they were the closest. The fight was later joined by the 40 Division and 17 Division. Their actual operational areas lie on the eastern border, and none had ever carried out any war games or training exercises on terrorism-based scenarios. Additionally, units needed interpreters to talk to the locals, giving them more of an alien outlook. It took the army time to realize the importance of knowing the language and understanding the customs. Learning main words of pushto, and main features of the culture later became part of the syllabus taught to troops before deployment.

Few arms whose importance came to fore during the war on terror and which then rapidly grew in size and resources include Special Services Group, aviation and intelligence. While infantry is the main arm fighting the terrorists, these other arms act as force multipliers. Units of other arms such as armour and artillery initially participated in their own particular role, however they were later also employed on infantry role to provide respite

to infantry battalions whose high recycling and reemployment rate in the war on terror was effecting a toll on their state of preparedness for conventional operations, and certain other matters also. Frontier Corps has overtime been fully overhauled. In the past its role mostly was anti-smuggling, however it was now facing the major brunt of the enemy and therefore needed an overhaul. It has come up as a very potent fighting force. The idea of pre-induction training of units has now been institutionalized and commanding officers are very particular about imparting best possible training to their men. Anti terrorist training has also been institutionalized in all military and civilian schools of instructions such the Pakistan Military & Police Academies. Few institutions have also popped up such as the National Combat Training Centre (NCTC, Pabbi) and others. The concept of quick impact projects has also seeped in to keep the local populace on own side.

National media and its military counterpart, Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) also bloomed in the same timeframe. From a single PTV channel and a medium-sized Directorate hardly two decades ago, both the national media and ISPR grew manifolds into formidable powerhouses, capable of fighting Pakistan's case internationally, making public opinions, and leaving lasting impressions. Their direct support paid rich dividends in painting the correct picture at home and abroad.

The Academic Debate about Terrorism and Countering Terror

Over the years, government officials, security forces and intellectuals have struggled with defining terrorism and evolving strategies to fight it. The idea that 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter', has kept the world confused about the correct definition of terrorism and terrorists. It is only natural that a correct strategy can only be adopted, once a correct understanding of the problem is established. Various terms have cropped up over time such as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Insurgency & Counter Insurgency (COIN), Terrorism and Counter Terrorism (CT), Sub Conventional Warfare (SCW), Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) and Stability, Civil Assistance & Normalization (SCAN) operations, extremism etc. Though these terms are intertwined and difficult to

separate from each other, each term merits a different response. Identifying the correct nature of the problem, and applying the correct response, is an act of supreme judgment. Unfortunately it is exactly here, where most of the mistakes have been made, both internationally and domestically.

Terrorism in Pakistan has ethnic, sectarian, linguistic and cultural aspects also, which need to be kept in mind. Again, one shoe may not fit all. As an example, it may be understood that while TTP, Baloch Nationalists and Sipah E-Sahaba sectarian activists apply the same tool of terrorism to further their agendas, and also occasionally come in support of each other, however the strategies required to address all three of them are different.

Other intricacies include vested interests of foreign players. Some foreign players refer to the prevailing situation in Pakistan as a counter insurgency operation, and try to propagate it in the same manner internationally. That is not how GoP reflects on the situation. For a counter insurgency operation, there has to be an insurgency in the first place. For an insurgency, there has to be a sizeable portion of the population, which should revolt against the incumbent government for political reasons, with a view to overthrow the government, or secession. This is not the case in Pakistan. Neither TTP is sizeable enough, nor does it seek secession. That is why foreign players propagating such themes are thought to have hidden nefarious designs against Pakistan.

The Humanitarian & Social Cost of War

Pakistan has had to pay a huge price to maintain its sovereign democratic status within the last two decades. Loss of life and property has been common and psychological effects thereof, have been far-reaching. As a whole, 61,927¹ people have lost their lives in terrorism-related violence in the preceding years, which include 21667 civilians, 6714 security personnel and 33546 terrorists. On a comparative basis, US forces have lost less than 2400 personnel in their war in Afghanistan, while 9/11 attacks had resulted in the death of less than 3000 people. These figures give an idea about the extent of loss and sufferings faced by the people.

¹ South Asian Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>

FATALITIES IN TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN 2003-2017²

<i>Serial</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Civilians</i>	<i>Security Force Personnel</i>	<i>Terrorists/ Insurgents</i>	<i>Total</i>
1.	2003	140	24	25	189
2.	2004	435	184	244	863
3.	2005	430	81	137	648
4.	2006	608	325	538	1471
5.	2007	1522	597	1479	3598
6.	2008	2155	654	3906	6715
7.	2009	2324	991	8389	11704
8.	2010	1796	469	5170	7435
9.	2011	2738	765	2800	6303
10.	2012	3007	732	2472	6211
11.	2013	3001	676	1702	5379
12.	2014	1781	533	3182	5496
13.	2015	940	339	2403	3682
14.	2016	612	293	898	1803
15.	2017	178	51	201	430
Total		21667	6714	33546	61927

War on terror brought with it the concept of suicidal attacks. While the Kamikaze Japanese fighter pilots had used suicidal tactics in WW-2, however their widespread use as a weapon grew after 9/11. The issue with suicidal attacks is that they will always prove fatal, irrespective of how many precautions are taken. The death toll may vary, but they will continue to leave a deep mark.

2 South Asian Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>

SUICIDE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN: 2002-2017³

<i>Serial</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>
1.	2002	1	15	34
2.	2003	2	69	103
3.	2004	7	89	321
4.	2005	4	84	219
5.	2006	7	161	352
6.	2007	54	765	1677
7.	2008	59	893	1846
8.	2009	76	949	2356
9.	2010	49	1167	2199
10.	2011	41	628	1183
11.	2012	39	365	607
12.	2013	43	751	1411
13.	2014	25	336	601
14.	2015	19	161	360
15.	2016	19	401	935+
16.	2017	7	134	476
Total*		452	6968	14680+

Over time, Pakistan has also taken the shape of a garrisoned state. Military deployments in settled areas are common, a sight unwelcomed in any well developed society. Barriers, check posts, cameras, security personnel are spread all over. One is unlikely to travel for more than 50 km, without encountering 2-3 check posts. A present-day teenager is unlikely to have any memory of the country without such fortifications. They have grown up amidst terror attacks, suicidal bombings, beheadings and military operations.

Though Sports and Tourism industries were already facing challenges, they fell to new lows⁴ as a result of the attack on the Marriott Hotel Islamabad in 2008 and the Sri Lankan Cricket Team in 2009. ICC Champions Trophy was shifted⁴ from Pakistan to South Africa. Pakistan has not seen any international cricket in

3 South Asian Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenat_tack.htm

4 The cost of Conflict in Pakistan, Centre for Research & Security Studies, page 17-18.

its stadiums since 2009. Even its own domestic was organized in Dubai. The nations' jubilations were worth watching once the final match of was held in Lahore, instead of Dubai.



MARRIOTT ISLAMABAD - 20 SEPTEMBER 2008

A truck loaded with approximately 600 kg explosives, exploded at the entry gate of the hotel killing 53, including the Czech ambassador and injuring another 266.

Despite having 36 world heritage sites, seven of the highest mountains in the world, remains of the oldest civilizations (Mehrgarh, Indus, Gandhara, Harrappa & Mohenjodaro), and many other attractions, Pakistan is frequented by less than a million tourists a year. In 2017, it was ranked 124⁵ of 136 countries in terms of tourism, which was considered an improvement. While the tourism industry contributes \$7.6 trillion dollars to the global economy, Pakistan's share this year was a meager \$ 317 million.

The Economic Cost of War

The economic cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions for Pakistan. Military operations and terrorist activities caused massive damage to the infrastructure. Foreign investment, both direct and indirect, also stopped flowing in. Tourism fell to an all time low. Funds that could have otherwise been spent on social uplift of the poor, had to per force be spent on security related

5 DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1325829>

equipment. More recently, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in its annual report has concluded that the war on terror has cost Pakistan \$118.3 Billion⁶, since it started in 2002.

US Aid to Pakistan has flowed in mostly through two funds⁷; the *Coalition Support Fund (CSF)* and the *Economic Support Fund (ESF)*. Though much hue and cry has been made of the payments Pakistan received through the CSF, the fact of the matter is that firstly, those payments were meant to recoup the expenses carried out in terms of ammunition, equipment, repairs etc which were ongoing expenses, secondly these payments were often tied to a number of *ifs' and buts'* and *'do mores'*, and thirdly the CSF payments have never been more than a billion dollars per annum⁸, which are peanuts in the face of what Pakistan had lost economically. Hence drawing a relation between Pakistan's economic losses and the CSF payments is absolutely incorrect.

TYPES OF ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ARMED CONFLICT⁹

Serial	Economic Dimension	Effect
1.	<i>Economic Growth</i>	<i>Negatives, sometimes dramatically.</i>
2.	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Negative due to (i) production fall (ii) shift to domestic sales (iii) disruption in international markets.</i>
3.	<i>Sectoral Distribution</i>	<i>Shift from tradable to non-tradable sectors, e.g. the undermining of banks and failure of transport system.</i>
4.	<i>Consumption</i>	<i>Negative, in spite of reduced domestic savings and increased foreign borrowing and aid.</i>
5.	<i>Investment</i>	<i>Sharp fall in government capital formation and private investment, due to budgetary restrictions and increased uncertainty.</i>
6.	<i>Budget Deficit</i>	<i>Increase, due to increased spending, while revenues do not always increase.</i>
7.	<i>Distribution of Government Spending</i>	<i>Increased share allocated to the military, making it difficult to sustain social and economic expenditure.</i>

6 DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1297305>

7 The Pak-US Alliance in the Fight Against Terrorism: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, Thesis, Fazal, Khaldon, Jones, Raja, Naval Post Graduate School, December 2011, page 22.

8 DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1297305>

9 Economic consequences of Major Internal Armed Conflicts, Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2001, page 230-232.

8.	<i>Civic Entitlements</i>	<i>NGO efforts to provide food and services could in some cases partially compensate for lost public entitlements, while in other cases NGOs were able to do little, as communities disintegrated.</i>
9.	<i>Human Costs</i>	<i>Heavy human costs—increased infant mortality rates, deteriorating nutrition, health and educational standards—as a result of falling entitlements and war-induced famines.</i>
10.	<i>Development Costs</i>	<i>Heavy development costs due to destruction of capital and reduced investment.</i>

FATA has been the worst hit by war on terror. A 2009 FATA Report summarizes the economic effects of war on terror on FATA as follows:

SUMMARY OF COST OF WAR IN FATA - AT A GLANCE¹⁰

Serial	Sector	Tentative Cost (In Millions)	
		Pak Rupees (PKR)	US Dollars (USD)
1.	<i>Infrastructure Losses</i>	8270	103
2.	<i>Human Losses</i>	4405	55
3.	<i>Economic Costs</i>	9505	119
4.	<i>Social Costs</i>	88725	1109
5.	<i>Environmental Costs</i>	15000	188
6.	<i>Security & IDPs Costs</i>	45766	572
Total		171671	2146

The 'Do more' mantra vis-à-vis Pakistan's Contributions to Global War on Terrorism

While countries have mostly extended only vocal or moral support to the war on terror, Pakistan's contributions have been completely physical and real. Despite this, Pakistan has consistently been asked to do more by US authorities. Dr Hidayat Khan has explained Pakistan's contributions at length in his paper¹¹, a gist of which is appended below:

Cooperation with the international coalition to curb terrorism.

- Immigration control measures to keep a check on the movement of potential extremists.

¹⁰ Cost of Conflict in FATA, Planning and Development Department, FATA Secretariat, April 2009, page 3.

¹¹ Pakistan's Contributions to Global War on Terror after 9 / 11, Dr Hidayat Khan, IPRI Journal, XIII, No 1, (Winter 2013): page 37-56

- Action against fanatical and extremist organizations and groups.
- Detention of Jihadi leaders.
- Banning Jihadi organizations.
- Reformation and regulation of madaris encompassing, NOC (No Objection Certificate) for the opening of madaris, registration of madaris, review of their syllabi and a curb on the number of foreign students attending them.
- Regulation of Mosques including NOC required for opening a mosque, political activities in mosques made unlawful and the use of loudspeakers restricted to the Azaan (the call to prayers).
- Provision of Pasni, Gwadar, Dalbandin & Shamsi airbases.
- Provision of air corridor over Pakistan which also entailed re-routing own flights.
- Provision of Naval Dockyard / base at Pasni, which also entailed reducing own activities there, an operation dubbed as the largest US amphibious operation since the Korean War.
- Provision of land routes for NATO supplies, which counted for 75 % of total NATO requirements.
- Intelligence sharing which enabled many countries to preempt terrorist activities on their land.
- Physical deployment of approximately 120,000 paramilitary and regular troops in support of ISAF / NATO operations.
- Banning of militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) etc
- Capture of more than 700 hardcore Al Qaeda militants including some of its senior leadership.
- Launching a number of military operations in its own tribal areas in support of OEF.

Each point mentioned above has a sizeable amount of data supporting it. The US mantra to *do more* is therefore not only incorrect, it even appears insulting at times when Pakistani

efforts are not appreciated, or ignored. If US thinks that more pressure would bring about better performance or results then they are clearly not looking at what the country is already doing within its limited resources. On the contrary, more pressure has proved counter-productive in the past, wherein anti-US sentiment amongst the masses has increased and they have asked the government to separate their ways from the U.S. Though the US had quieted down on its mantra for some time, its demand has resurfaced recently, as evident from General McMaster's statement that he gave in Afghanistan:

"US hopes Pakistani leaders will understand that it is in their interest to go after terrorist groups less selectively than they have in the past and the best way to pursue their interest in the country and elsewhere is through diplomacy not through the use of proxies and engaging in violence".

General McMaster, U.S. National Security Adviser

Interview to ToloNews, Afghanistan on 16 April 2017¹²

The Menace of Drones

A common word now, Drones were more a work of science fiction as late as the end of the 20th century. Only a handful of countries possess the Drone Technology, even today. The surprise and accuracy a drone achieves against its target is unmatched.

As the war on terror progressed, U.S.' use of Drones on Pakistani soil undermined the credibility of GoP in an environment, where the overall war on terror was deeply resented in the first place. Demonstrations and riots would be commonplace after every drone attack. The US remained unmoved however. The GoP would sometimes be forced to claim a drone attack as its own, and would at other occasions protest against U.S. drone attacks. Though never officially acknowledged, it was generally believed that the GoP had extended its tacit approval to the U.S.'s use of drones in Pakistani territory. Though considered tactically rewarding, the use of drones in Pakistan costed the Americans dearly in strategic terms, as it increased the anti-U.S. sentiment amongst the people.

"Well, the drone hits in Afghanistan and Iraq, they don't see children, they don't see anybody. They kill women, children,

¹² DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1327673>

they kill everybody. It's a war and in war, they kill people. They're killing all Muslims."

Faisal Shahzad.

'Would be' Times Square Bomber.

To a Judge during his trial in June 2010¹³.

It was argued that Drones were the best weapon for precision engagements with minimum collateral damage, and were able to target some of the most wanted terrorists. However the efficacy of a drone strike is directly dependant on the accuracy of the intelligence report, which is not always accurate, a fact that Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for. Overall, while drones may have been helpful to the US, for Pakistan their use proved to be detrimental. At one occasion, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government blocked the NATO supply route in retaliation to continued drone strikes in Pakistan.

The U.S. use of drones did propel Pakistan into acquiring / developing its indigenous drone capability, so that it could take complete ownership of drone warfare and could thus rally public support behind its operations. Pakistan now holds the indigenously developed "Burraq" drone.



DRONE STRIKES

Wreckage of vehicle carrying Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, killed in a US drone strike in the Ahmed Wal area of Balochistan on 21 May 2016.

¹³ The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare, Michael J. Boyle, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013, page 1.

In September 2012, Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar captured the drone dilemma very well in her remarks¹⁴ :

“This has to be our war. We are the ones who have to fight against them. As a drone flies over the territory of Pakistan, it becomes an American war again. And this whole logic of this being our fight, in our own interest is immediately put aside and again it is a war which is imposed on us.”

DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN: 2005-2017¹⁵

Serial	Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
1.	2005	1	1	0
2.	2006	0	0	0
3.	2007	1	20	15
4.	2008	19	156	17
5.	2009	46	536	75
6.	2010	90	831	85+
7.	2011	59	548	52
8.	2012	46	344	37
9.	2013	24	158	29
10.	2014	19	122	26
11.	2015	14	85	17
12.	2016	3	7	1
13.	2017	1	2	0
Total*		323	2810	354+

The Chinese Interests in Pakistan's Internal War

China is an all weather friend of Pakistan, as is indicated by the claim that *'Pak-China friendship is higher than Himalayas & sweeter than Honey'*. China has extended its support to Pakistan throughout the war and has also guarded Pakistan's national interests internationally. It has countered Indian moves of equating the Kashmiri struggle with terrorism. It however remains concerned about the unrest in its Muslim Uighur community, in the Xinjiang province. The leadership of this community is extended moral support by TTP, and Uighur leaders have at occasions taken refuge

¹⁴ The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare, Michael J. Boyle, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013, page 17.

¹⁵ South Asian Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.htm>

in NWA, prior to ZeA. Such actions keep China involved in Pakistan's tribal areas and its war on terror.

The *China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)*, is expected to usher in a new era of Pak-China cooperation and is also expected to turn around Pakistan's economy. Its passage through Kashmir and Baluchistan is also very meaningful and has strategic implications. On one hand, it lends credence to Pakistan's case for Kashmir, and on another, it brings direly needed economic and developmental activity to Baluchistan. Of course in return, it offers advantages to China also, the shortening of logistic routes from China to Middle East and Europe, amongst others. Large Chinese investments in Pakistan are also raising Chinese stakes for a peaceful and stable Pakistan.

Brighter prospects for Pakistan, growing Chinese international stature and strengthening Pak-China relations remain sources of concern for both regional and international powers, who may be happier to see these relations unravel. Traces of their involvement in instability in Pakistan have occasionally been found, the drone attack killing Mullah Mansoor, and confessional statements of Kulbushan Yadav are cases in point.

The Indian Factor

It is no secret that India and Pakistan are not the best of friends. While Pakistan, realizing the futility and dangers of perpetual animosity has consistently tried to normalize its relations with its neighbor, unfortunately it has not been able to make much headway owing to Indian stubbornness. The general theme is that Indians have till date not been able to reconcile with Pakistan's creation and are continuously conspiring for its implosion, Indian support to Bengali, Baluch, Sindhi and Muhajir secessionist leaders being cases in point.

The War on Terror provided India new opportunities to stir trouble for Pakistan. From the beginning, India tried to project Pakistan as a terror-supporting state, and tried to equate the indigenous Kashmiri freedom struggle with terrorism at the international level, with a view to discredit the GoP and dilute the legitimacy of the freedom struggle. Pakistani diplomatic prong has

yet been able to contain Indian hegemonic designs, however as Indian clout continues to rise at the international level, pressure on Pakistan continues to rise with it.

From day one of the War on Terror, Pakistani security forces found traces of Indian involvement with various extremist organizations. Concerns increased when India started to develop its consulates in Qandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sahreef. India undertook a number of developmental projects¹⁶ inside Afghanistan such as the Delaram-Zaranj road in Nimroz, Salam Dam in Herat, construction of a new Parliament building, a gift of 400 buses 200 mini buses & 105 utility vehicles, and training to Afghan National Army and Afghan Police etc, which brought the Indian and Afghan governments closer. Over the years, Pakistani authorities alleged that Afghan soil was being used by Indian authorities against Pakistan. In the recent past, Ehsanullah Ehsan, the TTP spokesman who voluntarily surrendered to Pakistani authorities confessed to connections between TTP leadership and Indian authorities.

India has tried to gain maximum advantage out of the prevailing Pakistani predicament. It first blamed GoP in 2002 for sponsoring the attack on the Indian parliament, launched Operation *Parakaram*, and moved its forces to the Indo-Pak border with a view to attack Pakistan, however it was stopped short in its tracks due to the rapid deployment of Pakistani forces all along the border, closing down the perceived window of opportunity. After the Mumbai attack of 2008, India again moved its forces to the international border to which the Pakistanis responded in kind. Both armies spent 8 months in eyeball to eyeball deployment and then returned without any engagement.

India has played an instrumental role in causing disturbance in Baluchistan also. It provides moral and material support to separatist leaders, and sponsors sub-nationalistic and sectarian terrorist activities. The red-handed capture of Kulbhushan Yadav, a serving Indian Naval Intelligence officer within Baluchistan, his sensational confessions, and his ongoing trial in the 'International Court of Justice' (ICJ) finally exposed Indian interference in Pakistan at the international level. India has also offered amnesty to Baluch separatist leaders and has announced to launch a Baluchi channel.

¹⁶ Indian influence in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan, Prof Dr Umbreen Javed & Rameesha Javed, page 4-5.

The Case of the IDPs / TDPs (Internally Displaced Persons / Temporarily Displaced Persons)

UN¹⁷ defines IDPs as:

"Internally displaced persons, are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."

Both *terrorist activities* and the resultant *military operations* thereafter, made living in FATA impossible for local communities. Consequently, large masses of people were forced to abandon their original habitats, and moved to safer places. When IDPs moved out of their homes, they did so with hopes of coming back sooner rather than later. That wish however did not materialize for all IDPs since their hometowns were razed to the ground during the fighting. IDPs have suffered socially, economically and psychologically where each IDP has a story to tell of sufferings of the past and a hazy future. The IDP challenge had also put unprecedented strain over the government machinery. IDPs needed to be housed, fed, provided basic amenities and returned to their homes as soon as possible. The government struggled in all fields and despite best efforts, was unable to address all the issues. At some point a debate between the correct nomenclature of IDPs (Internally Displaced People) and TDPs¹⁸ (Temporarily displaced people) also caught some negative attention.

As per the statistics of IDMC¹⁹ (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), by the end of 2015, Pakistan had approximately 1.5 million IDPs within its folds as a result of terrorism/counter terrorism operations/internal security situation, while 0.7 million IDPs had returned to their places of origin in the same year. This figure had touched 2.7 million²⁰ in April 2009, once a flood of 2.3 million IDPs came out of Malakand within a fortnight. IDPs either stay with 'host communities' or are settled in 'IDP camps'. While

17 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement - 1998

18 DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1131711>

19 IDMC, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/pakistan/figures-analysis>

20 Internal Displacement in Pakistan, Contemporary Challenges, Najmuddin, HRCF, October 2010.

GoP and INGOs make preparations for these IDPs every time, experience has shown that 90%²¹ of the IDPs prefer to stay with the host communities such as their relatives, and only 10 % land up in the camps. As of 31 March 2016, the UNHCR data²² shows 178,461 families as IDPs, of whom 99% reside with host communities while only 1% reside in the IDP camps.



IDPs- JUNE 2014

IDPs from NWA queue outside the World Food Program (WFP) distribution point in Bannu for relief supplies.

Dealing IDPs has its own challenges, and merits a complete strategy with both short term and long term fixes. The short term²³ fixes include immediate relief, shelter food medicine, clean drinking water, sanitation etc, while the long term²⁴ fixes include returning and rehabilitation at the places of origin. For this, significant donor support is essential which is not always easily available. For instance as a consequence of ZeA, GoP calculated its requirement of funds for IDPs as \$753²⁵ million, however the 2nd Donor Conference could only generate \$375 million from the World Bank and European Union.

21 Crisis of IDPs in FATA, Issue, Challenges and way Forward, Report by FATA Research Centre, January 2014, page 13.

22 UNHCR, KP and FATA IDP Statistics, as of 31 March 2016.

23 Struggling IDPs of North Waziristan in the wake of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Nida Hameed, NDU Journal 2015, page 102.

24 Struggling IDPs of North Waziristan in the wake of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Nida Hameed, NDU Journal 2015, page 102.

25 Struggling IDPs of North Waziristan in the wake of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Nida Hameed, NDU Journal 2015, page 105.

Few results of a quantitative research²⁶ of IDPs based on 817 IDPs of varied geographic and demographic backgrounds in 2014 are appended below. These give an insight to how the IDPs reflect on their problems and solutions:

- 68% were willing to return to their areas of origin if their personal security was ensured, 21% were not willing even if the situation improved, while 11% did not reply.
- 49% agreed that they could start a normal life upon returning to their original areas, 33% disagreed while 18% were unsure.
- 42% agreed that they would be able to startup their businesses once again after moving back to their areas, 37% disagreed and 21% could not respond due to uncertainty of the situation.
- 63% agreed that the Jirga system was the main tool for dispute resolution and justice, 29% disagreed.
- 75% agreed that militancy had affected their social gatherings e.g. marriages, funerals, khatams, Eid etc, 18% disagreed while 8% chose not to respond.
- 47% agreed that they saw change and development in their life standards in post disaster and displacement situation, 42% expressed no subtle change while 10% did not respond.
- 93 % agreed that military operations had affected their homes and property in the displaced areas, 3% disagreed and 4% did not respond.
- 45% showed their concerns about situation of the displaced areas after military operations, 44% were satisfied while 11% could not respond due to lack of information regarding the current situation.
- 85% agreed that they had faced financial losses during displacement, 12% did not face any financial losses while 3% did not participate.
- 75% were not satisfied with the level of assistance provided by GoP and INGOs in the form of food or cash, while 19% replied otherwise.

²⁶ Crisis of IDPs in FATA, Issue, Challenges and way Forward, Report by FATA Research Centre, January 2014, page 23-31.

It is worth noting that due to the lack of resources, GoP and the international community have concentrated more on relief, while resources are less available for rehabilitation, which leads to growing frustration within the IDPs.

The Question of the Good and Bad Taliban

This predicament has haunted Pakistan for the better part of its war on terror. The U.S. propagated international opinion is that Pakistan strikes against some groups of Taliban and intentionally leaves others untouched. Broadly speaking it is insinuated (and sometimes very forcefully), that Pakistan chooses to fight the TTP but not the Afghan Taliban. This particular point merits detailed deliberation.

It is understood that neither the GoP, nor its people wished for this war in the first place. Even when it became inevitable, Pakistan first tried to play the role of a facilitator of negotiations between the US and the Taliban Government. It chose to fight only when no other option was left. During the ongoing fight, it even tried to sign peace deals with the militants at various occasions. For a correct understanding one needs to understand Pakistan's security imperatives before joining the blame game.



JALLALUDDIN HAQQANI
Leader of the Haqqani Network.

Firstly, Pakistan realizes that while the coalition forces will one day wind up and go back to their Alpine Resorts, as has happened in the past, Pakistan and Afghanistan will be left with each other, to solve their problems. Secondly, it also understands that the Taliban represent a large segment of the Afghan society, and no political solution in Afghanistan can be reached till they are made part of the political process, a fact that the West has only recently accepted. Thirdly, Pakistan is a developing third world country which lacks the wherewithal to take on all opposing factions at once. Prudently speaking, even all the U.S. and western military might combined have nothing much to show for the war they have fought for 17 years in Afghanistan. Fourthly, Pakistan has a real live threat on its eastern border and it cannot afford to have debilitating stress on the western border as well. And lastly, Pakistan shares sizeable Pushtun ethnicity with Afghanistan, and has thus to take into account the public sentiment about the war, into its long term planning.

These reasons are not intended as arguments for differentiating between good and bad Taliban. They are intended only to give a better insight into Pakistan's war on terror-related decision making processes. It is smart for Pakistan not to offend its neighbors or its own population, to reflect forwardly on the future South Asian environment, and to correctly assess its own abilities to take on belligerents.

Incidentally, Pakistan has also voiced a similar complaint against the coalition forces, that the coalition chooses to engage its targets both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, sometimes through drones, but when Pakistan requests them to engage a target of their choice, Pakistani requests are not entertained. Display of such apathy by coalition forces, lends credence to conspiracies that the coalition forces have no intentions of helping Pakistan, some going as far as insinuating that the coalition forces intentionally stir up trouble for Pakistan.

Afghanistan as Pakistan's Strategic Depth – A Misconception

One of the biggest misconception spread without any solid grounds or verification, and which has eventually found its place at the heart of this war is the idea that Pakistan somehow views Afghanistan as its *strategic depth*. Nothing could be more twisted and strategically shallow than this line of thinking.

Strategic depth for what? Strategic depth in case India attacks and overruns the whole country? In which case the people and armed forces of Pakistan will withdraw to Afghanistan to reorganize and launch a peoples' war against India? A very wild idea indeed! It sounds similar to something Hitler's general staff would have recommended to him during the WWII (World War 2). And we all know how Hitler finally ended up.

While some Pakistani strategic thinkers may have obliquely referred to Afghanistan as Pakistan's strategic depth during the 80s', once the Afghan Jihad was ongoing, their comments appear to be inspired by religious and ethnic affinities, rather than diktats of realpolitik. This comment is also based on the presumption that both countries would always be obliged to maintain excellent relations, and the assumption that Pakistan Armed forces would fight a classic WWII pattern rear guard action, with most of their assets intact, and would then regroup in Afghan territory and launch again.

Even if this idea had some credence at the time it surfaced in the 80s', (which even then was quite unlikely), Indo-Pak warfare of the 21st century is altogether a different ballgame. These forces now operate under a nuclear overhang, and if pushed to the wall, Pakistan reserves its right of first use of nuclear weapons. This statement alone should put to rest the theory of Afghanistan being Pakistan's Strategic Depth, and all of its likes.

Pakistan's other National Security Issues and their linkage to its War on Terror (Baluchistan Issue, Sectarian Killings & Unrest in Karachi)

Pakistan has had to face a host of national security issues in the preceding decades, significant of which are the Baluchistan issue, sectarian killings and unrest in Karachi. These subjects have intentionally been avoided in this book, since each merits an independent study. It may however be appreciated that a deeper understanding of Pakistan's internal security matters will remain incomplete without studying all of the above.

Experience has shown that terrorists, criminals, sectarian extremists etc are all from the same flock and therefore reinforce or help each other, either when their objectives coincide, or when

they face assured annihilation by LEAs. The unrest created by one of these factions in an area, automatically creates safe havens for the others. In addition, once these groups choose to integrate and coordinate their actions, they cause a response dilemma for the state LEAs, consequently diluting the state's response to the extent of ineffectiveness. Thus, even if their ideologies do not conform to each other, they are still more than willing to assist one another in times of desperation.

While in the past GoP used to formulate separate strategies for engaging these groups, events eventually have pushed it towards a unidirectional response, which has more similarities than differences. Operation ZeA and Radd-ul-Fassad are aimed against all miscreants across the board and have put them on the run without discrimination.

Evolution of Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan

A PIPS (Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services) study²⁷ shows that Pakistan had to commence with its anti terrorism legislation almost right from its birth, with the Public Representative Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA-1949) promulgated by Prime Minister Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, used to control the political unrest in the country. The legislative process evolved with the passage of time under both civilian and military rules, as per the requirements of the time e.g. at times regulations were made in relation to the unrest in East Pakistan, at times due to MQM-sponsored unrest in Karachi, at times to address sectarian issues and lately to address the fallout of 9/11. As is the case with all anti-terrorism laws, they often impinge negatively on civil liberties. In such cases the civil society and the courts had to intervene from time to time, to avoid skewed use of the legislations, and to ensure necessary amendments.

One however is forced to conclude (as does the PIPS study) that Pakistan has had more of an issue with implementation of the laws, rather than their presence. Also, leaders have often focused on extending their tenures, arm-twisting of their political opponents and consolidating their grip on power, rather than ensuring implementation of the regulations across the board. In such instances, the laws have proved to be counter-productive

²⁷ Evolution of Counter Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan, Saba Noor, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, October – December 2008.

and have instigated people to act against government orders, e.g. Musharraf's declaration of emergency, implementation of Provisional Constitutional Order and suspension of the Constitution had been perceived as ill-intentioned, and propagated as his methods to continuously cling to power. Pakistan made its Cyber Terrorism and Electronic Crimes Act in 2007.

COUNTER TERRORISM LAWS IN PAKISTAN²⁸

1.	<u>Pakistan Penal Code-1860</u> <i>Terrorist related crimes were dealt under the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC), which covered offences of waging / attempting to / wage, or abetment in waging war against Pakistan (Section 121 PPC), collection of arms etc. with the intention of waging war (Section 122 PPC), assaulting President, Governor etc. (Section 124 PPC), Sedition (Section 124-A PPC) and Mutiny (Section 131 PPC), High-jacking (Section 402-B and C of PPC) and Mischief (Section 436-PPC). These sections of law still form part of the Pakistan Penal Code.</i>
2.	<u>Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Acts (1974-1997)</u> <i>History of special legislation regarding terrorism in Pakistan starts with the legislation of Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1974. Thereafter, Special Courts for Speedy Trial Ordinance 1987, Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Court) Ordinance 1990, Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance 1991 and Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992 were promulgated / enacted.</i>
3.	<u>The Anti-Terrorism Act-1997</u> <i>Provides broad definition of terrorism. Established timelines for investigation and trial with specific tenure of judges. Amendments were introduced to make the law more pragmatic abiding the courts by the same procedural rules of regular courts. Appeals were to be made to respective High Courts and ultimately Supreme Court thus disbanding the special Appellate Tribunals. These amendments disallowed a parallel judicial system. The ATA 1997 has been amended 22 times with the most recent amendment in 2013.</i>
4.	<u>Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance-2000</u> <i>The Ordinance extending to the whole of the country, disallows the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or retaining of chemical weapons. Also no person can transfer, directly or indirectly, a chemical weapon to anyone, use a chemical weapon, engage in any military preparations to use a chemical weapon, assist, encourage or induce any other person to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the convention, or use a riot control agent as a method of warfare. The Violator would be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 25 years.</i>

²⁸ National Internal Security Policy 2014 – 2018, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Annex S, pages 66 -67, and Annex Z, pages 81-84

5.	<u>Anti Money Laundering Act-2010</u> The law replaced the Anti Money Laundering Ordinance 2007 and provided the basic legal framework to counter money laundering and terrorist financing. A powerful Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) was established along with a high powered body comprising four federal ministers, Governor State Bank of Pakistan, Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission and Chairman NAB.
6.	<u>Counter Insurgency (In Aid to Civil Power) Regulation-2011</u> This regulation was specifically meant to curb the menace of terrorism especially in areas of FATA and PATA where the armed forces have been called in aid of civil power administration. This regulation also provides mechanism of keeping the suspects in custody as internees.
7.	<u>National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) Act-2013</u> Approved by the Parliament on 26 March, 2013 the Act provided a structure for developing counter terrorism strategies, facilitating coordination and integration of counter terrorism efforts.
8.	<u>The Investigations for Fair Trials Act-2013</u> The law allows intelligence and law enforcement agencies to tap phone calls, SMS, e-mails, internet communication and carry out covert intelligence on anyone suspected to be involved in terrorist acts after acquiring a warrant from a High Court judge.
9.	<u>Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Act-2013</u> To establish a number of new Anti Terrorist Courts in Karachi to deal with hundreds of cases of heinous crimes and sternly deal with extortionists, target killers, kidnappers for ransom and members of mafias in Karachi. Giving CAFs shoot-on-sight powers for maintenance of peace while providing a very short period for investigation.
10.	<u>Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act-2013</u> The law expands the definition of terrorism to include, intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, business community and preparing or attacking the civilians, media persons, government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies. It also included keeping pre-charged detention period for suspected terrorists at 90 days, denying passports and arms licenses to members of banned outfits, considering the carrying of explosives without reason to be an illegal act, running illegal FM radio stations etc.
11.	<u>Protection of Pakistan Ordinance-2013</u> Reinforced the Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2013 targeting millions of non-Pakistanis living in the country for any reason including distressful conditions in their parent country (especially since 1979). Defines 'enemy alien' to be a person who fails to establish citizenship of Pakistan and is suspected to be involved in waging war or insurrection against Pakistan or depredation on its territory. It gives power to police officers, armed forces and civil armed forces to arrest without warrant, enter and search without warrant any premises likely to be used in the commission of scheduled offences.

12.	<u>Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (Amendment)-2014</u> Reinforced the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 targeting Pakistanis involved in waging war against Pakistan and extending their detention period beyond 90 days limit of Article 10 of the constitution by stripping them of their nationality. It defines 'Combatant Enemy' to be a person who fails to establish citizenship of Pakistan and is suspected to be involved in waging war or insurrection against Pakistan or any other country through an act which is also a crime in Pakistan. It also regulates the 'Internment Centers' and addresses issues of Missing Persons.
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The Durand Line & Border Management Issues

The Durand Line issue finds its roots²⁹ in the Great Game played between the British Raj and Tsarist Russia in the 19th century. It came into being as a result of an agreement between the Afghan King Abdul Rehman, and the then Foreign Secretary of British India, Sir Mortier Durand in 1893. Since its inception, the Durand Line has been a constant cause of turmoil and strained relations between the governments on both sides of the line.

Once the departure of the British was in sight in 1947, Afghanistan taking advantage of the opportunity offered, questioned the legitimacy of the border and laid a claim to certain areas on Pakistani side of the border. The Afghan stance has been a cause of stress between the two countries ever since.

The Afghan arguments and Pakistani counter arguments on the issue can be summarized as under³⁰:

- **Validity of the Agreement Expired either after 100 years of the Agreement, or after the King's Death.** Some people in Afghanistan opine that the agreement was valid for 100 years and therefore expired in 1993, while others argue that it was valid only till the death of King Abdul Rehman. They also maintain that the text of the document signed by the King, and the one made public by the British were different³¹. Pakistan maintains that while no document exists to prove the 100 years claim, the claim till death of the King can be traced in

29 The Durand Line: History and Implications of British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan, Thesis by Anne Ma Payne, Ohio University, May 2012.

30 Institute of Policy Studies, <http://www.ips.org.pk/the-muslim-world/986-pak-afghan-relations-the-durand-line-issue>

31 Durand Line, History, Legality & Future, Arka Biswas, Vivekananda International Foundation, Occasional Paper, September 2013, page 23 .

some old documents. However, even that claim no more holds true since further agreements in later years overrule it. Firstly, the same agreement had later been ratified by King Habibullah in the *Dane-Habibullah* Agreement signed on 21 March 1905, secondly it was accepted as an international border in the Rawalpindi Agreement on 8 August 1919, and thirdly it was again accepted as an international border in the Kabul Agreement of 22 November 1921. These three agreements of later years give the border permanence and overrule the idea of expiry of The Durand Line.

- **Durand Line was valid only till British India Existed.**

Afghanistan nullified all treaties with British Raj in July 1947, even before the birth of Pakistan. Thus its relations with Pakistan started on wrong footings as it launched a diplomatic maneuver to garner international support for its stance. However international law, particularly the *Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties* (VCSST) stipulates that succession of states will not affect existing agreements relating to international borders. Therefore, the Durand Line stays as per international law. This law of *uti possedetis juris*³², has been repeatedly applied by the United Nations in various countries during the de-colonization period. Afghanistan will surely lose its case on legal grounds if it opts for arbitration or chooses to take the case to International Court of Justice (ICJ).

- **Durand Line was Imposed under Duress.** While some in Afghanistan argue that the agreement of 1893 was signed under duress, available evidence does not support this claim. It is counter argued that firstly, King Abdul Rehman managed to get the British Aid increased from 1.2 million rupees to 1.8 million rupees in return for signing the agreement; secondly, King Abdul Rehman's available diaries show that he was very proud of his achievement and quoted it with delight in front of his audiences; thirdly, the matter is not of one agreement but of four as explained above, and all agreements could not have been

³² Pakistan Afghanistan Border management – A Legal Perspective, Mr. Ahmer Bilal Sufi, PILDAT report, March 2015, page 12

under duress; and last but not the least, external pressures have always existed throughout human history while defining international borders, and this logic cannot be applied to unravel or re-draw the entire world's borders.

- **Division of Pashtuns sharing the same Race, Ethnicity, Language & Culture.** Afghanistan argues that the Pashtun people who belong to the same race, creed and culture are split by the border, which is morally unjustifiable. It is counter argued that people are often split on most of the international borders and this criterion is untenable to decide borders. Afghanistan shares borders and ethnicity with Central Asian States, and if it feels that way, then it should also lay similar claims against CARs, which re-emerged after the Soviet Union imploded. This inconsistency of claiming territories at will, sans principles, weakens the Afghan stance. Secondly, Afghanistan's all remaining borders were forced onto it without consultation e.g. its borders with Russia and China were decided by Russia and Britain and the border with Iran was decided between Iran and Britain. Afghanistan was not included in either of these talks, and yet it does not object to those borders, but prefers an objection to the one in which it was a part of consultation and consensus.
- **Agreement refers to Spheres of Influence, Not Borders.** Some argue that the Durand Agreement talks of *spheres of influence* only and not of an international border. However a closer study of the agreement would reveal facts to the contrary.
- **Stance of International Community.** In addition to above, the international community including the superpowers also accepts Durand Line as the Pak-Afghan border.
- **Boundary Commission asked for by Afghan King.** Again, the boundary commission had been asked for³³ by King Abdul Rehman himself, rather than it being imposed upon him by the British.

At one time, Musharraf government, fed up with the *do*

³³ Durand Line, History, Legality & Future, Arka Biswas, Vivekananda International Foundation, Occasional Paper, September 2013, page 6-7.

more mantra and the free movement of terrorists across the border decide to fence the Durand Line, however the idea of fencing the border was strongly opposed by Afghanistan on account of a number of reasons, the prime reason being that it did not recognize it as an international border. Fencing of Durand Line finally commenced in July 2017 on the orders of the Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa. The Director General Inter Services Public Relations, Major General Asif Ghafoor explained it as under:

*"Measures to improve security situation along the Pak-Afghan border continue. In line with the directions of Chief of Army Staff, phased fencing of entire Pak-Afghan border has commenced. In phase 1, high infiltration prone border areas in Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Agencies are being fenced. In phase 2 fencing of remaining border areas including Baluchistan will be executed. Besides fencing, Pakistan Army and FC KP are constructing new Forts / Border Posts to improve surveillance and defensibility. A secure Pak-Afghan border is in common interest of both countries and a well coordinated border security mechanism is essential for enduring peace and stability."*³⁴

ISPR Press release
20 June 2017

³⁴ https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=4062

DURAND LINE AGREEMENT

12 NOVEMBER 1893

Agreement between Amir Abdurrahman Khan, G. C. S. I., and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K. C. I. E., C. S. I.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:

1. The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.

2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness, the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to his Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier the line will be drawn as follows:

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half-way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning south-wards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

6. The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future, as far as possible, all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

7. Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

H. M. Durand,
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.
Kabul, November 12, 1893.

Finances of Terror

Where do the terrorists get the money from? This question has often boggled the mind of the layman. Understandably, waging a protracted war requires financial resources. If those resources are correctly identified and choked, terrorism could lose its teeth, and its efforts could be blunted. However, no country has yet been able to completely choke this financing.

Though otherwise *fanatically religious*, terrorists have proven to be very *pragmatic* in matters of their financing. For example, TTP has been able to acquire fatwas from certain clerics making petty crimes *halal* (kosher), if the proceeds would go to a perceived good cause. It has thereafter relied heavily on such petty crimes³⁵ like kidnapping for ransom, extortion, bank robberies etc for financing of nefarious designs.

Drug trafficking has also been a source of their income. With almost 80% of the world's drugs coming from Afghanistan, they contribute greatly in keeping the Taliban campaign alive. In the past, some Afghan drugs used to flow through Pakistani territory, thus generating a sizeable drug-based economy in Afghanistan. These drugs would also finance the TTP.



Fence on Pak-Afghan Border - June 2017

35 The Friday Times, <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/what-does-ttp-want/>

However, overtime, the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) has been able to tighten the noose around the drug mafia, and as a result the flow has been drastically reduced.

In addition TTP has at times received funding from Afghan Taliban³⁶ also, as explained by their spokesman Shahidullah Shahid in an interview. To the international community, this is to a certain degree a surprising claim, considering that it is often argued that Pakistan funds the Afghan Taliban and considers them as Good Taliban, a claim which Pakistan vehemently denies. U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel³⁷ has also claimed that India finances troubles for Pakistan from Afghanistan. Funds are also raised through charities, sale of hides on Eid-ul-Azha etc. The *Hawala* or *Hundi* (Alternative Remittance System) is an important channel through which terrorists circulate funds around the globe.

Choking finances of terrorists was a main agenda point of NAP and by September 2016, the government had frozen Rs. 1.2 billion³⁸ in the accounts of 8400 terror suspects starting from the Lal Masjid cleric. In 2007, GoP constituted the Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU)³⁹ in the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), to combat money laundering and Terrorist Financing, under the Anti-Money Laundering Act – 2010.

Pak-U.S. Relations & the War on Terror

Pak-U.S. relations have seen their fair share of ups and downs. While the Afghan Jihad brought both the countries closer together, the end of Russo-Afghan War brought a visible change. U.S. departed from the region unceremoniously and left Pakistan with its hands full with a civil war in Afghanistan. Bilateral relations thereafter dipped down, and various kinds of sanctions were imposed on Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear interests, particularly after the country went overtly nuclear in 1998.

Pak-U.S. relations found new grounds after 9/11, wherein the U.S. essentially needed Pakistan's unstinted support to launch its operations into Afghanistan. Pakistan joined the *with us camp* and contributed tremendously to the war on terror, however an

36 DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1048011>

37 Tribune, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/512867/india-financed-problems-for-pakistan-from-afghanistan-chuck-hagel/>

38 Geo News, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/115831-Accounts-of-over-8400-terror-financing-suspects-being-frozen>

39 Financial Monitoring Unit, <http://www.fmu.gov.pk/index.html>

air of mistrust continued to mar the Pak-U.S. relations, for which the U.S. ought to be held responsible, more than Pakistan. U.S. did not correctly understand, nor did it try to understand Pakistan's predicament post of 9/11. It completely overlooked the presence of the issues of Durand Line, presence of Taliban and their supporters astride the Pak-Afghan border, and the severe repercussion Pakistan was to face later. Instead, it continued with its 'do-more' mantra, without accounting for Pakistan's efforts and its capacity limitations.

Pakistan's relation with the U.S. fluctuated like a pendulum between the *"Most allied ally"* and the *"most dangerous state"*. Such conflicting opinion of Pak policies within a decade caused excessive strain on the country's relations with the U.S. Events such as the Salala attack, Raymond Davis case and the Abbottabad attack forced the relationship to hit rock bottom. Pakistan was at times blamed for playing a double game, by not acting against the Afghan Taliban hiding in its tribal areas. Both countries did however work in close, but guarded cooperation during the war and their military establishments drew from each others' experience. Most of Al Qaeda's leadership was apprehended primarily due to the cooperation of Pakistan's LEAs.

U.S. drone attacks on Pakistani soil and the covert deployment of non-official groups such as the *Blackwater (renamed Xenon)* and *DynaCorp* further strained the relations. The *Kerry-Lugar Act (KLA) 2009*⁴⁰, became another thorn in the relations which associated financial support of Pakistan with its performance in War on Terror, in a manner that satisfied the U.S. authorities. The nation strongly rejected the Act, considering it impinging on its national sovereignty.

On 21 August 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled the new U.S. Afghan Policy. During his speech Trump adopted a heavy-handed approach towards Pakistan:

"The next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach in how to deal with Pakistan. We can no longer be silent about Pakistan's safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort

40 An Estranged Client and as Annoyed Patron: Shift in the Pakistan-US Relations during the 'War on Terror', Syed Hussain Shaheed Soharwardi, Journal of Political Science, Vol 18, Issue-2, 2011, page 64.

*in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists. In the past, Pakistan has been a valued partner. Our militaries have worked together against common enemies. The Pakistani people have suffered greatly from terrorism and extremism. We recognize those contributions and those sacrifices, but Pakistan has also sheltered the same organizations that try every single day to kill our people. We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars, at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But that will have to change. And that will change immediately. No partnership can survive a country's harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials. It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order and to peace."*⁴¹

U.S. President Donald Trump

21 August 2017,

Fort Myers, Virginia

Pakistan's rebuttal of Trump's allegations has been strong. Pakistani media, politicians and think tanks have strongly denounced Trump's statement, and have viewed it as an attempt to use Pakistan as a scapegoat, to throw the blame of U.S. failings in Afghanistan, onto Pakistan's shoulders. Such allegations are likely to be counter-productive, and would force Pakistan to recalculate its strategic options, pushing Pakistan more towards the Chinese and Russian camps. Trump's call for India to play a greater role in Afghanistan have rung bells in Pakistan and has been equated with 'crossing the red line'.

*"Another critical part of the South Asian strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India, the world's largest democracy and a key security and economic partner of the United States. We appreciate India's important contributions to stability in Afghanistan, but India makes billions of dollars in trade with the United States, and we want them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development. We are committed to pursuing our shared objectives for peace and security in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region."*⁴²

U.S. President Donald Trump

21 August 2017,

Fort Myers, Virginia

⁴¹ <http://www.npr.org/2017/08/21/545038935/watch-live-trump-s-address-on-afghanistan-next-steps-for-us-engagement>

⁴² <http://www.npr.org/2017/08/21/545038935/watch-live-trump-s-address-on-afghanistan-next-steps-for-us-engagement>

The narrated extract of Trump's speech forces one to conclude that Pak-US relations will continue their roller coaster ride for some time in the future. The fact that Trump is now taking sides between India and Pakistan is destabilizing the region and negatively effecting counter terrorism efforts.

Madaris & their Reforms

Madaris (religious seminaries) have been instrumental in imparting Islamic education to muslims around the world. Earliest known madaris include the *Fatimid Madrasa*⁴³ (singular of Madaris) in Egypt established in 1005 AD, and the *Seljuk Madrasa*⁴⁴ made by Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi in Baghdad in 1067 AD. Madaris initially imparted both *scholastic theology and earthly knowledge* to its disciples and still do the same in most parts of the world. However the madaris in the Indo-Pak subcontinent started closing their doors to the outer world, initially in retaliation to the British Raj's western education system. They have followed the same trend till date. The syllabus taught at Pakistani madaris is named *Dars-e-Nizami*, after its founder, *Mulla Nizamuddin Sihalwi* (Died 1748). The syllabus is almost completely devoid of modern world sciences and other earthly subjects. It includes only religious texts, mostly in Arabic and Persian. Pakistani madaris are grouped under five schools of thought (i) Deobandi (ii) Barelvi (iii) Ahl-e-Hadith (iv) Salafi and (v) Shia.

DEENI MADARIS – INSTITUTIONS, TEACHERS & ENROLMENTS – 2013 / 14⁴⁵

Serial	Province	Institutions	Enrolment	Teachers
1.	Punjab	5888	800243	25147
2.	Sindh	2018	362512	11527
3.	KP	2836	406486	12511
4.	Baluchistan	726	78521	2985
5.	AJ&K	1269	106273	3272
6.	GB	93	15857	456
7.	FATA	529	53671	2089
8.	ICT	46	12580	646
9.	Total	13405	1836143	58633

43 Islamic Education, A Brief History of Madrassas, with comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices, Uzma Anzar, March 2003, page 3.

44 Islamic Education, A Brief History of Madrassas, with comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices, Uzma Anzar, March 2003, page 3.

45 Pakistan Education Statistics, 2013-2014, Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, March 2015, page 72.

Madaris came to limelight after 9/11 as almost all Taliban whether Afghan or Pakistani nationals, were found to be graduates of various madaris. Needless to say, they all shone in bad light. Even the 9/11 Commission Report pointed towards madaris as the incubators of violent extremism, Jamia Hafsa being a case in point. While the government had earlier taken half-hearted steps to uplift and reform the madaris, those efforts had not borne much fruit. However after 9/11, lukewarm response was no longer acceptable and drastic measures needed to be taken.

Despite stiff resistance from various hardliners, the Musharraf government promulgated the *Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance (PMEBO)*⁴⁶, in 2001. Till the implementation of PMEBO, provinces were allowed to regulate madaris under the *Societies Registration Act of 1860*, duly amended from time to time. Later in 2009, the PPP government expressed its intentions of replicating the Turkish model of madaris, wherein all madaris are state-controlled, however these efforts were again blocked by certain clerics.

Ittehad-e-Tanzeemaat-e-Madaris-Pakistan (ITMP) was founded to thwart the governmental onslaught, and to show that the clerics would streamline the madaris affairs themselves.

The government thereafter embarked to implement reforms in the madaris. Supervisory boards at provincial and federal levels were instituted, registration was made mandatory for madaris, syllabi were revised, modern subjects were made compulsory, and reforms were made regarding matters of hostel accommodation and funding etc.

⁴⁶ Reforms in Religious Madaris of Pakistan, Fakhul-Islam, The Dialogue, Vol IV Number II, page 199.

CONCLUSION

The preceding two decades have seen unprecedented horrors of death and destruction globally. Fighter aircrafts and artillery guns have been used in thickly populated areas, societies have been ripped apart by civil commotions, and governments have been toppled by their disenchanted electorates. Pakistan has been at the centre-stage of this entire catastrophe. It has been in the eye of the storm.

Pakistan found itself in a challenging predicament post of 9/11. As the events slowly unfolded, it felt caught in a fight it did not want to be a part of. Yes, it was principally aligned with the U.S., but it could also not afford to abandon either the Afghan Taliban or to alienate its own people of its tribal areas, collectively known as FATA. The country managed to play a positive and major role in OEF, as a result thereof and almost simultaneously, it started facing the brunt of terrorism, and helplessly saw the war spread out towards its settled areas.

Though Pakistan tried to mend fences with the militants and made several peace deals such as the Shakai, Sararogha and Miran Shah Agreements, by 2007, the war had spread to almost all corners of the country. Arguably, the nadir of the war came in the shape of the Lal Masjid episode, the Raymond Davis case, the Aafia Siddiqui case and the Abbottabad incursion, killing Bin Ladin. The country was facing schismatic tentions and international pundits were forecasting a bleak future for the land.

The Pakistani nation would prove the pundits wrong. Introspective thinking and politico-military pragmatism brought it back from the brink of imminent implosion. Operation Raah-e-Raast gave a new hope to the people at large. Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fassad have ushered in peace and stability. Political decisions such as formation of NACTA, adoption of NISP and approval of NAP have given a new life to the state organs.

While there was once a time when the intervals between terrorist attacks were hardly few hours, these attacks are now few and far between. Though it may not sound as the best of situations, the improvement from the past is indeed dramatic. As the security situation improves by the day, one sees the political players also maturing up from their past mistakes and getting their house in order. Economy too seems promising with \$40 billion investment on its way with CPEC and similar projects. The road ahead is surely of hope, happiness and prosperity!

LIST OF ORGANISATIONS PROSCRIBED IN PAKISTAN ¹

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Proscription Date</u>	<u>Group Leader</u>
1.	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LI)	14 Aug 2001	Malik Ishaq
2.	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	14 Aug 2001	Allama Syed Muhammad Raza Naqvi
3.	Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM)	14 Jan 2002	Moulana Muhammad Azhar
4.	Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT)	14 Jan 2002	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Zia-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi
5.	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	14 Jan 2002	Moulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi
6.	Tahreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan (JTP)	14 Jan 2002	Allama Sajid Naqvi
7.	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)	14 Jan 2002	Maulana Sufi Muhammad
8.	Tehreek-e-Islami	14 Jan 2002	Allama Arif Hussain
9.	Al-Qaeda	17 Mar 2003	Dr Aiman Al Zawahiri
10.	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP)	15 Nov 2003	Moulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi
11.	Khuddam-ul-Islam (Ex JM)	15 Nov 2003	Moulana Masood Azhar
12.	Islami Tehreek Pakistan (Ex TIP)	15 Nov 2003	Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi
13.	Jamia Ul Ansar	20 Nov 2003	Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil
14.	Jamiat-ul-Furqan	20 Nov 2003	Commander Jabar & Yar Muhammad
15.	Hizb-ul-Tehrir	20 Nov 2003	Naveed Azhar Hussain Butt
16.	Khair-un-Naas International Trust	27 Oct 2004	Abu Shoaib
17.	Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)	7 Apr 2006	Harbiyar Marri

¹ National Internal Security Policy, 2014-2018, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, page 58-60.

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18.	Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan	21 Aug 2006	
19.	Lashkr-e-Islam	30 Jun 2008	Mangal Bagh Afridi
20.	Ansar-u-Islam	30 Jun 2008	Maulana Qazi Mahboob ul Haq
21.	Haji Namdar Group	30 Jun 2008	Haji Namdar (Former)
22.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	25 Aug 2008	
23.	Baluchistan Republication Army (BRA)	8 Sep 2010	Braham Dagh Bugti
24.	Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF)	8 Sep 2010	Bebrag Baluch
25.	Lashkar-e-Baluchistan (LeB)	8 Sep 2010	
26.	Baluchistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	8 Sep 2010	Khair Bakhsh Marri
27.	Baluchistan Musalla Defah Tanzeem (BDMT)	8 Sep 2010	
28.	Shia Tulaba Action Committee, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Agha Zia-u-Din
29.	Markaz Sabeel Organization, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Agha Zia-u-Din
30.	Tanzeem Naujawanan-e-Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Qazi Nisar
31.	Peoples Aman Committee (Lyari), Karachi	10 Oct 2011	
32.	Ahl-e-Sunnat Waljamat (ASWJ)	15 Feb 2012	
33.	Al Harmain Foundation (AHF)	6 Mar 2012	
34.	Rabita Trust (BT)	6 Mar 2012	

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35.	Anjuman-e-Imamia Gilgit Baltistan (AIGB)	24 Apr 2012	Agha Rahat Hussain
36.	Muslim Students Organization (MSO) Gilgit Baltistan	24 Apr 2012	Shafaat Ullah Tariq
37.	Tanzeem Ahl- e-Sunnat Wal Jamat,Gilgit Baltistan	5 Jun 2012	Ahmed Raza Khan Bareilvi & Mustafa Raza Khan
38.	Baluchistan Bunyad Parast Army (BBPA)	4 Aug 2012	
39.	Tehreek Nafaz-e- Aman (TNA)	4 Aug 2012	
40.	Tahafuz Hadudullah (TH)	4 Aug 2012	
41.	Baluchistan Waja Liberation Army (BWLA)	4 Aug 2012	
42.	Baluch Republican Party Azad (BPRA)	4 Aug 2012	
43.	Baluchistan United Army (BUA)	4 Aug 2012	
44.	Islam Mujahidin (IM)	4 Aug 2012	
45.	Jaish-e-Islam (Jel)	4 Aug 2012	
46.	Baluchistan National Liberation Army (BNLA)	4 Aug 2012	
47.	Khana-e-Hikmat	13 Mar 2013	
48.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS)	15 Mar 2013	
49.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Mohmand (TTM)	15 Mar 2013	
50.	Tariq Geedar Group (TGG)	15 Mar 2013	Tariq Geedar
51.	Abdullah Azam Brigade	15 Mar 2013	

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52.	East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	15 Mar 2013	
53.	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	15 Mar 2013	
54.	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)	15 Mar 2013	
55.	313 Brigade	15 Mar 2013	
56.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Bajaur (TTB)	15 Mar 2013	Faqir Muhammad
57.	Amar Bil Masroof Wanahi Anil Munkir (Haji Namdar GP)	15 Mar 2013	Haji Namdar (Former)
58.	Baluch Student Organization Azad (BSO-A)	15 Mar 2013	Bashir Zeb
59.	United Baluch Army (UBA)	15 Mar 2013	
60.	Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM)	15 Mar 2013	
<u>ENLISTED UNDER UNSCR 1267</u>			
61.	Jamaat-ul-Daawa	10 Dec 2008	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
62.	Al-Akhtar Trust	10 Dec 2008	Muhammad Mazhar
63.	Al Rashid Trust	10 Dec 2008	Sheikh-UI-Mashaikh Mufti Rasheed

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